Standing Committee D

[Dame Marion Roe in the Chair]

Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill

Clause 116 - Harassment intended to deter lawful activities

Amendment moved [this day]: Amendment No. 341, in clause 116, page 82, line 29, after 'be', insert 'reasonably considered to be'.—[Dr. Evan Harris.] 
Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

Marion Roe: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment No. 342, in clause 116, page 82, line 29, after 'victim', insert 'or target'. 
Clause stand part. 
Amendment No. 343, in clause 117, page 83, line 27, after 'presence', insert 'or conduct'. 
Amendment No. 344, in clause 117, page 83, leave out lines 42 to 44. 
Amendment No. 223, in clause 117, page 84, line 4, leave out from 'liable' to end of line 6 and insert— 
'(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or to both, 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine, or to both.'. 
Amendment No. 224, in clause 117, page 84, line 13, leave out 'in uniform'. Clause 117 stand part. 
Amendment No. 225, in clause 118, page 84, line 41, leave out from 'liable' to end of line 43 and insert— 
'(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or both, 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine, or to both.'. 
Amendment No. 101, in clause 118, page 85, line 4, at end add— 
 '(7D) Any person to whom a constable has given a direction under subsection (4)(b) may appeal against the making of the direction to a magistrates' court.'. 
Amendment No. 254, in clause 118, page 85, line 4, at end add— 
 '(7D) Any person to whom a constable has given a direction under subsection (4)(b) may appeal against the making of the direction to a magistrates' court in the circumstances where the period specified under subsection (4)(b) exceeds 10 days.'. 
Clause 118 stand part. 
New clause 18—Names and addresses of members of companies: individual application— 
 'The following section is inserted after section 723C of the Companies Act 1985— 
 ''723CA Individual members' confidentiality orders
 (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, an individual may make an application under this section to the Secretary of State where the condition in subsection (2) is satisfied. 
 (2) That condition is that the individual— 
(a) is or proposes to become a member of a relevant company; and 
(b) considers that the availability for inspection by members of the public of particulars of his name and usual residential or business address creates, or (if an order is not made under this section) is likely to create, a serious risk that he or a person who lives with him or is an employee of his will be subjected to violence or intimidation (''a serious risk''). 
 (3) Where, on an application made by an individual under this section, the Secretary of State is satisfied that the availability for inspection by members of the public of the particulars of the individual's usual residential address creates or (if an order is not made under this section) is likely to create a serious risk that the individual, or a person who lives with him, or an employee of his will be subjected to violence or intimidation, he shall make an order under this section (''an individual member's confidentiality order'') in relation to him. 
 (4) Otherwise, he shall dismiss the application. 
 (5) At any time when an individual member's confidentiality order is in force in relation to an individual the name and address of the individual in the register of members of the company which is the subject of the confidentiality order shall not be disclosed to any person who may request either the company or Companies House disclosure of such name and address save in prescribed circumstances. 
 (6) The Secretary of State shall give the applicant notice of his decision under subsection (3) or (4); and a notice under this subsection shall be given within such period and shall contain such information as may be prescribed. 
 (7) The Secretary of State may at any time revoke an individual member's confidentiality order if he is satisfied that such conditions as may be prescribed are satisfied.''.'. 
New clause 19—Names and addresses of members of companies: company application— 
 'The following section is inserted after section 723CA of the Companies Act 1985 as inserted by section [Names and addresses of members of companies: individual application]— 
 ''723CB Company members confidentiality orders 
 (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a company may make an application under this section to the Secretary of State where the condition in subsection (2) is satisfied. 
 (2) That condition is that the company considers that the availability for inspection by members of the public of particulars of the names and usual residential or business addresses of the members of the company creates, or (if an order is not made under this section) is likely to create, a serious risk that a member of the company or a person who lives with or is an employee of a member of the company will be subjected to violence or intimidation (''a serious risk''). 
 (3) Where, on an application made by a company under this section, the Secretary of State is satisfied that the availability for inspection by members of the public of the particulars of that company's members' usual residential addresses creates or (if an order is not made under this section) is likely to create a serious risk that a member, or a person who lives with him, or an employee of his will be subjected to violence or intimidation, he shall make an order under this section (''a company members confidentiality order'') in relation the company. 
 (4) Otherwise, he shall dismiss the application. 
 (5) At any time when a company members confidentiality order is in force in relation to a company, the name and address of any individual in the register of members of the company that is the subject of the confidentiality order, shall not be disclosed to any person who may request either the company or Companies House disclosure of such names and addresses save in prescribed circumstances.
 (6) The Secretary of State shall give the applicant notice of his decision under subsection (3) or (4); and a notice under this subsection shall be given within such period and shall contain such information as may be prescribed. 
 (7) The Secretary of State may at any time revoke a company members confidentiality order if he is satisfied that such conditions as may be prescribed are satisfied.''.'. 
New clause 20—Addresses of chargees or mortgagees of companies— 
 'The following section is inserted after section 723CB of the Companies Act 1985 as inserted by section [ Names and addresses of members of companies: company application]— 
 ''723CC Chargee confidentiality orders 
 (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, an individual may make an application under this section to the Secretary of State where the condition in subsection (2) is satisfied. 
 (2) That condition is that the individual— 
(a) is or proposes to become a chargee or mortgagee of a relevant company; and 
(b) considers that the availability for inspection by members of the public of particulars of his or its name and usual residential or business address creates, or (if an order is not made under this section) is likely to create, a serious risk that he or a person who lives with him or is an employee of his or it will be subjected to violence or intimidation ('the serious risk'). 
 (3) Where, on an application made by an individual under this section, the Secretary of State is satisfied that the availability for inspection by members of the public of the particulars of the individual's usual residential or business address in relation to documents required to be held by Companies House or by the company in relation to the charge or mortgage creates or (if an order is not made under this section) is likely to create a serious risk that the individual, or a person who lives with him, or an employee of his will be subjected to violence or intimidation, he shall make an order under this section ('a chargee confidentiality order') in relation to him. 
 (4) Otherwise, he shall dismiss the application. 
 (5) Where a chargee confidentiality order is made under subsection (3) above the name and residential or business address of the chargee or mortgagee of the company that is the subject of the confidentiality order shall not be revealed to any person who may request either the company or Companies House access to such name and address save in prescribed circumstances. 
 (6) The Secretary of State shall give the applicant notice of his decision under subsection (3) or (4); and a notice under this subsection shall be given within such period and shall contain such information as may be prescribed by regulations. 
 (7) The Secretary of State may at any time revoke a chargee confidentiality order if he is satisfied that such conditions as may be prescribed are satisfied.''.'. 
New clause 21—Confidentiality orders: associated companies— 
 'The following section is inserted after section 723CC of the Companies Act 1985 as inserted by section [Addresses of chargees or mortgagees of companies]— 
 ''723CD Confidentiality orders: associated companies 
 (1) Where a relevant confidentiality order is made in relation to a relevant company and the Secretary of State is satisfied that in relation to another company ('company A') the condition in subsection (2) below applies, he shall extend the operation of the order to that other company or make a further relevant confidentiality order (including a confidentiality order of a different kind) in relation to that other company, as the case may be. 
 (2) The condition is that the availability for inspection or disclosure by members of the public of the particulars of the appropriate individual's usual residential or business address in a document relating to company A which is, by virtue of this Act required to be available for such inspection or disclosure, creates (or if an order is not extended or made under this section) is likely to create a serious risk that the individual, or a person who lives with him, or an employee of his will be subject to violence or intimidation. 
 (4) The Secretary of State shall give the applicant notice of his decision under subsection (1); and a notice under this subsection shall be given within such period and shall contain such information as may be prescribed. 
 (5) The Secretary of State may at any time revoke a decision or a relevant confidentiality order made under this section if he is satisfied that such conditions as may be prescribed are satisfied.''.'. 
New clause 22—Director's confidentiality orders: directors etc.— 
 '(1) In this section 723C(1) of the Companies Act 1985 (effect of confidentiality orders), the words ''that were contained in a document delivered to the registrar after the order came into force'' are replaced by ''that are contained in a document delivered to the registrar at any time''. 
 (2) In section 723D(3)(b) of that Act (construction of sections 723B and 723C) the words ''after the order came into force'' are replaced by ''at any time''. 
 (3) In section 723B(3), (7), (8)(d), (9), section 723C(1), (6)(a), (7)(a) and 723D(4) of that Act and in the headings to the said sections 723B and 723C, the words ''confidentiality order'' and ''confidentiality orders'' are replaced by ''director's confidentiality order'' and ''director's confidentiality orders'' as the case may be.''.'. 
New clause 23—Confidentiality orders: miscellaneous— 
 '(1) The following amendments are made to the Companies Act 1985. 
 (2) In section 709(1) (Inspection, etc of records kept by the registrar), ''section 723B'' is replaced by ''sections 723B, 723CA, 723CB, 723CC and 723CD''. 
 (3) In section 356, (inspection of register of members), after subsection (6), the following subsection is inserted— ''(7)Subsections (1) and (6) are subject to sections 723CA and 723CB.'' 
 (4) In section 408, (right to inspect instruments which create charges, etc), after subsection (4), the following subsection is inserted— ''(5)Subsections (1) and (4) are subject to sections 723CC.''. 
 (5) In section 723C(4) (effect of confidentiality order), ''confidentiality order'' is replaced by ''relevant confidentiality order''. 
 (6) In section 723D (construction of sections 723B and 723C)— 
(a) In subsection (1), ''section 723B'' is replaced by ''sections 723B, 723CA, 723CB, 723CC and 723CD'', 
(b) In subsection (4)— 
(i) ''section 723B and 723C'' is replaced by ''sections 723B, 723C, 723CA, 723CB, 723CC and 723CD'', 
(ii) the following definition is inserted in the appropriate place— '''relevant confidentiality order' means a director's confidentiality order, individual member's confidentiality order, company members' confidentiality order or chargee's confidentiality order;'' 
(c) Subsection (6) is omitted. 
 (7) In section 723E(1) (offences), ''section 723B'' is replaced by ''sections 723B, 723D, 723E, 723F or 723G''.'. 
New clause 26—Economic damage to companies— 
'(1) A person (''person A'') commits an offence under this section if by acting in accordance with subsection (2) he causes financial damage to another person (''person B''), with the purpose of representing to person B, or persuading person B— 
(i) that he should not do something that he is legally entitled to do; or 
(ii) that he should do something that he is not under any legal obligation to do. 
 (2) A person acts in accordance with this subsection if those actions— 
(a) involve the harassment of or violence against person B or a connected person, or
(b) involve damage to property of person B or a connected person. 
 (3) A connected person, for the purposes of subsection (2) above, means— 
(a) a customer of person B; 
(b) a shareholder of person B; 
(c) an employee of person B; 
(d) a director of person B; 
(e) where person B is a partnership, its partners; 
(f) a supplier of goods or services to person B; 
(g) a supplier of goods or services to persons within paragraph (f) above; 
(h) an individual normally residing with any individual falling within paragraphs (a) to (g) above. 
 (4) A constable may arrest without warrant anyone whom he reasonably suspects to be committing an offence within subsection (1) above. 
 (5) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable— 
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both; 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine, or to both.'. 
New clause 32—Animal research; intention to cause economic loss— 
 '(1) A person commits an offence if, by acting in accordance with subsection (3) and with the necessary intent— 
(a) he induces one connected person— 
(i) to breach a contract between that connected person and another connected person, or 
(ii) to terminate a contract between that connected person and another connected person (whether or not the termination constitutes a breach of the contract), or 
(b) he persuades one connected person— 
(i) not to enter into a contract with another connected person, or 
(ii) not to have commercial dealings (of whatever nature) with another connected person. 
 (2) No person shall be guilty of an offence under this section— 
(a) by virtue of his doing anything in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, 
(b) if he is exercising any power conferred on him by any enactment, 
(c) if he is acting for the purposes of making a protected disclosure falling within Part IVA of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (protected disclosures). 
 (3) A person acts in accordance with this subsection if he carries out or threatens any unlawful activity against a connected person (whether or not that person is one of the connected persons mentioned in subsection (1)). 
 (4) In subsection (1), the necessary intent is the intent to— 
(a) prevent, stop or hinder an animal research facility operator or a person who is not, but may become, an animal research facility operator doing something which he is entitled to do, or 
(b) persuade an animal research facility operator or a person who is not, but may become, an animal research facility operator to do something which he is not under any obligation to do. 
 (5) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable— 
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both, 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine, or to both. 
 (6) In this section— ''animal research facility operator'' means a person under whose direction or control the following are carried out—
(a) regulated procedures for the purposes of the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 (c. 14) (''the 1986 Act''), as described in section 2 of that Act, or 
(b) the breeding of protected animals under the authority of a certificate under section 7 of the 1986 Act; ''connected persons'' are— 
(c) animal research facility operators, 
(d) holders of licences under section 4 or 5 of the 1986 Act (personal licences and project licences), persons specified under section 6(5) or 7(5) of the 1986 Act (scientific procedure establishments and breeding and supplying establishments), 
(e) suppliers of goods or services to persons falling within paragraphs (a) to (c) or (f) to (k) of this subsection, 
(f) suppliers of goods or services to persons falling within paragraph (d) above, 
(g) customers of an animal research facility operator, 
(h) shareholders in an animal research facility operator (if the operator is a company), 
(i) subsidiaries of an animal research facility operator, 
(j) companies of which an animal research facility operator is a subsidiary, 
(k) trade organisations representing animal research facility operators, 
(l) trade unions whose members include employees of any person mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (i) above, 
(m) employees of any person mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (i) above, 
(n) where the person mentioned in paragraph (a) to (i) above is a company, its directors, 
(o) where the person mentioned in paragraph (a) to (f) above is a partnership firm its partners, and 
(p) individuals normally residing with any individual falling within paragraph (a) to (g) or (l) to (n) above; ''trade dispute'' has the same meaning as in Part IV of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, 
 (7) The Secretary of State may by order— 
(a) add a description of person to the list of connected persons in subsection (6), 
(b) remove a description of person from that list, 
(c) amend the list in some other way.'. 
Amendment No. 311, in title, line 10, after 'Scotland;', insert 
 'to make provision in connection with economic damage to companies;'.

Caroline Flint: Welcome to our proceedings, Dame Marion. I hope that we are going to make progress and, at the same time, have a good debate. At the end of the morning sitting, I was trying to clarify some of the issues surrounding the use of injunctions. At the risk of a repetition in Hansard, in case I did not make the points earlier, let me make it clear that under the amendments, the main company could get an injunction to protect smaller companies.
The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) asked whether supplier companies or contractors would have to be named in an injunction. I am advised that they do not have to be; for example, the injunction granted to Oxford university protects not just staff in the university's colleges, but contractors. They are defined simply as the contractors, sub-contractors and suppliers who are or will be engaged by the university to carry out work in connection with the construction of the university's research laboratory. I hope that that clarifies the situation. As I said earlier, ''person'' could include the  body corporate when we are talking about injunctions, and person in this regard would also cover university institutions. 
Clause 117 is designed to give additional protection to people who are being harassed at home because of the work that they do.

Evan Harris: Unless I missed it in the hubbub, I tabled another amendment to clause 116, dealing with whether the term victim or target should be used. There might have been another, too.

Caroline Flint: I think that I dealt with the issue of ''reasonably considered'', with which the hon. Gentleman's amendment No. 341 was concerned, in that we believe that ''may'' should suffice in this situation. One of the issues on which I elaborated earlier is that victims include not only immediate relatives but others who socialise, or are otherwise associated, with the individuals who work for organisations involved in animal research, or their suppliers. That is why we want to make sure that we do not leave any loopholes that could be exploited by extremists.
On the hon. Gentleman's amendment No. 342, we do not think that ''target'' adds anything. A person who is, or might be, a victim for the purposes of the subsection will already be a target. Therefore, we believe that clause 116 covers people who might be victims in future. I think that that was his concern.

Evan Harris: I think that what the hon. Lady said was that people who are victims will be targets. My question is, are all targets necessarily established as victims, or is she saying that ''victims'' is wide enough to cover people who are in the process of being victimised or are due to be?

Caroline Flint: I think that we would take the view that it covers a wider group than those who are currently victims. We are mindful of those who might be victims. That is important in the context of what I said earlier, namely that in such matters, it is not always the most immediately obvious group of people who are victims. I shall review the hon. Gentleman's comments later and see whether there is anything on which I can supply more assurance, if that will be of help to him.
Clause 117 concerns people who are being harassed at home because of the work that they do. I should stress that we fully support a person's right to protest peacefully and within the bounds of the law. However, when that protest turns to intimidation, threats of violence or worse, the police must have powers that enable them to deal effectively with the situation. 
As was outlined this morning, one of the problems is that such campaigns operate on a number of different fronts. Someone's name and address might appear on a website. Although that website does not necessarily directly say ''you will go out and vandalise this person's property''—the protesters running the websites are very clever about that and have their own legal advice—we feel that the inference is there. People's property is often vandalised within a short  space of time after their name and address have appeared on websites. Their cars have acid thrown on them, leaflets are sent around the neighbourhoods—saying in some cases that people are paedophiles—and so on. When linked to those other issues, a presence outside someone's home is about terror. That makes people concerned about what might happen next based on other examples. They have to try and get on with their everyday lives, but that presence outside their home adds to their sense of fear. 
The presence of groups of protesters outside the homes of employees of targeted companies is distressing, as it affects both the employees and their families, possibly including children and other vulnerable people living at that property. In one extreme case, a farmer and his family were subjected to constant protests at his farm for four years. There is a gap in the legislation. Currently, when the police are in attendance, they are generally able to contain protests in the vicinity of the person's home and often a direction to someone to stop drumming, take down an offensive banner or leave the area under section 42 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 is complied with before an arrest becomes necessary. However, the current provision does not cover the situation where a complaint is made about the presence of protesters outside a person's home but they disappear before the police arrive, or the police are unable to give a direction as they do not have the resources to enforce it at the time. 
The new offence set out in clause 117 significantly strengthens the existing law and will attract a specific power of arrest, so a constable would be able to make an arrest where he has reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence has taken place and the protester is guilty of the offence. That means the police can deal with protesters after the event, which will be useful if there is evidence of protest on CCTV, for example, but the police were not present, or they were present and could not identify the protesters, or there was some difficulty in enforcing a direction at the scene. 
The penalty for the new offence will be imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or both. However, that will rise to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or both, when the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 come in to force. 
Amendment No. 344 removes subsection (3) of the new offence. That subsection is needed to ensure that all those in a group could be charged with the new offence when it is the presence of the group as a whole that causes the harassment, rather than an individual on their own. For example, one person on their own wearing a tee-shirt saying ''Puppy Killer'' may not cause harassment, but if there is a group of people all wearing similar tee-shirts, harassment or distress may be caused. 
Amendments Nos. 223 and 225 seek to make the offences in clauses 117 and 118 triable either way. I understand the concerns expressed by Opposition  Members about the sentencing of animal rights extremists, but I do not think their amendments are appropriate or proportionate, nor would they be effective. The offence in clause 117 is comparable to harassment, which carries a maximum penalty of six months and/or a £5,000 fine. That is why the new offence has been drafted with the same maximum penalty. I have even more concerns regarding amendment No. 225, which would result in the new offence of contravening a police direction to stay from a person's home for a specified period also being triable either way and carrying a maximum sentence of three years on conviction on indictment. As drafted, the offence carries a maximum sentence of six months, which will become 51 weeks when custody plus is introduced. The penalty for the new offence is in line with that for the existing offence of ''non-compliance with a police direction'' under section 42 of the Criminal Justice & Police Act 2001. The offences do not justify the sort of penalty proposed by the Opposition. Other criminal behaviour, such as putting people in fear or if violence or damage occur, can be prosecuted under different offences that rightly carry much higher penalties. I hope that, if the evidence exists, those other offences can be used to deal with some of the people about whom we are talking. I understand the concerns about the sentencing of animal rights activists, and it is very important that the judiciary are fully aware of the aggravating nature of animal rights extremist activity and understand its impact on victims. However, increasing the penalties as the amendments propose would result in an offence framework that did not accurately reflect the relative seriousness of various offences. 
Harassment reflects a threat to an individual and is rightly a summary-only offence. Affray reflects a higher level of threat and requires the use or a threat of the use of violence towards another person, and a threat cannot be made by the use of words alone. The maximum penalty for affray is three years' imprisonment. Putting people in fear of violence is one level higher again, and attracts a maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment. Those are the sorts of offences that can be tried either way. The penalties that we have provided for and the offences in clauses 117 and 118 are appropriate for the level of offence, as we are talking about people being directed to leave because they are present outside someone's home. They do not necessarily have to engage in an activity for those offences to be applied. 
Other measures, including preventive orders such as antisocial behaviour orders, can also be taken and are effective. Heather Nicholson, who also uses the surnames Avery, Barwick and James, was convicted of common assault and aggravated trespass and received a five-year ASBO on Monday 17 January. That ASBO prevents her from going within 500 m of Phytopharm premises, Huntingdon Life Sciences research centres in Cambridgeshire and Suffolk, Halifax house at the University of Oxford, and Darley Oaks farm in Staffordshire. Additionally, she cannot knowingly contact the owners or employees of Phytopharm and  Huntingdon Life Sciences or their families. The ASBO also covers any company that does business with Huntingdon Life Sciences. That sends out the clear message that we can use ASBOs to great effect, because they tell people what they should not do, and if they breach an ASBO, they will be brought before the courts again.

Jonathan Djanogly: Is the Minister aware that at least one of the ASBOs to which she refers has been breached in Cambridgeshire and that the police decided not to prosecute? If she was not aware of that, will she investigate why it happened?

Caroline Flint: I am happy to look into that incident and the circumstances surrounding it, but my point remains that ASBOs can be used very appropriately to tackle certain individuals. As we know, communities that have been affected by the sort of activity that affected Darley Oaks are seeking injunctions and ASBOs to protect the wider community, which relates to the point made by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome.
In such circumstances, the penalties that we have outlined are appropriate for the offences that we are discussing. As Liberal Democrat Members have said, we should be mindful of the fact that we are pushing at boundaries in trying to find a balance between dealing with people who we fear are engaged in totally unacceptable activity and ensuring that we protect people's right to protest, which should not be restricted by the Bill. The offences we propose would deal with someone whose very presence, regardless of any conduct, is a threat. So the offences are strong and powerful, but should at the same time carry proportionate penalties. People engaged in other activities should, of course, be arrested and charged for those offences, and the higher offences would apply if they were found guilty of those offences in court. 
We must raise awareness of the effect on victims of animal rights activity through the national forum, which involves the Attorney-General, the Minister responsible for such matters in the Department of Trade and Industry, Ministers from the Department for Constitutional Affairs, officials, police and others doing relevant work, and myself. We meet regularly to oversee current activity and what the police are doing and to build better awareness. The Crown Prosecution Service has developed guidance on taking witness impact statements in animal rights extremist cases to maximise the prospects of obtaining appropriate disposals and orders such as ASBOs. The Court Service is educating magistrates and the courts about the methods and tactics of animal rights extremists, using guidance and best practice material so that the judiciary is aware of the aggravating nature of the activity when they consider relevant cases. 
As for amendment No. 224, I understand the wish of the hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr. Mitchell) to give police officers more flexibility in exercising their power of arrest for the offence of harassment outside a person's home. I think that Conservative thinking is in line with ours on that issue, but the amendment is a little premature, because we  are amending arrest powers more broadly elsewhere in the Bill. The arrest powers specified in clause 117(2) will cease to have effect on the commencement of clause 101. As hon. Members know, that clause codifies the powers of arrest available to a constable under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The effect of the wider changes will mean that the power to arrest without warrant will be exercised by any constable and not restricted to a constable in uniform. However, in the transition period before the changes come into effect, we wish to retain consistency between the arrest power for the new offence of harassment outside a person's home and the police's current power of arrest for non-compliance with a direction under section 42, which is currently exercised by a constable in uniform. 
Clause 118 strengthens the police powers to direct protestors to stay away from a person's home where harassment, alarm or distress is caused to the resident. The clause amends the existing direction power in section 42 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 to allow a constable to direct a protestor to leave the vicinity of the home and not to return within such period as the constable may specify, up to a maximum of three months. If the protestor returns to the vicinity of the premises within the specified period for the purposes of representing to or persuading the resident that he should not do something that he is entitled to do, or that he should do something that he is not obliged to do, he will commit an offence. The penalty for failing to comply with the direction or for returning to the area within the specified period will be imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or both. That will rise to a period of 51 weeks or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale when the relevant provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 come into force. Those penalties are consistent with the penalties for failing to comply with a direction from the police in other contexts. 
The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome commented about the effect of the provision on people in workplaces. I understand that that is covered by other legislation. Section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 gives the police powers to impose conditions on assemblies of as few as two people. A condition could include the direction to move away.

David Heath: That also covers the situation outside someone's home. If it is necessary to strengthen the law that applies outside the home, one would think that it was also necessary to strengthen the law that applies outside the place of work.

Caroline Flint: The circumstances that we are dealing with in relation to someone's home give rise to issues such as vulnerability in a community or neighbourhood. I will double check, but the measure is about a gap that we have identified and we do not believe that there are the same concerns about workplaces as about people's private home. We want to plug that gap.
Amendments Nos. 101 and 254 place an unnecessary hurdle in the way of the police in their exercise of the direction power, which may include an additional requirement not to return to the vicinity. That is related to appeal mechanisms. The amendments would create an anomaly in relation to other police direction powers that have no appeal mechanism. For example, the police have the power to direct protesters to leave land where they reasonably believe that a person is committing, has committed, or intends to commit the offence of aggravated trespass on land. If, having left the land, the person again enters as a trespasser within a period of three months, he commits an offence. More significantly, that the amendment would render the power to direct a person away and not to return unworkable. I have no need to remind hon. Members how canny that particular group of people are when it comes to exploiting the law. 
Safeguards are built into section 42 of the 2001 Act before a police officer can give a direction. A constable may give a direction to any person if that person is present outside or in the vicinity of any premises that are used by an individual as his dwelling, if the constable has reasonable grounds to believe that a person 
''is present there for the purpose . . . of representing to the resident or another individual . . . or of persuading the resident or such another individual— 
(i) that he should not do something that he is entitled or required to do; or 
(ii) that he should do something that he is not under any obligation to do'' 
and the constable also believes on reasonable grounds that the presence of the person amounts to or is likely to result in the harassment of the resident or is likely to cause alarm or distress to the resident. Those are the steps that have to be gone through before a constable can issue a direction, and rightly so. We are not seeking to give the police the power to ban all protests outside homes or to impose directions indiscriminately. I believe that clause 118 would clarify a grey area. When regular protests are taking place outside someone's home, it is not unreasonable for the police to have an additional ability to tell someone to leave the vicinity and not come back for a certain number days or weeks, or for three months at most.

Evan Harris: I hesitate to rise to discuss this amendment, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome. However, I am a little confused by what the Minister initially said about the powers in amendment No. 101 or the equivalent amendment tabled by the Conservatives meaning that the clause would be unworkable. Let us say that a constable said, ''Go away and do not come back for three months''. Neither those who have tabled the amendments nor I would suggest that direction should not come into force until it was confirmed by a magistrate; we simply propose that it should be challengeable later during the ban. I do not see how that would stop the operational effectiveness of the police direction.

Caroline Flint: When I say that the provision would become unworkable, I am voicing my belief that courts would be clogged up with appeals. There are other areas of law where the police can give direction without any right of appeal. I do not want to hamper the police, but in issuing a direction, a police officer has to go through a number of issues. I would be concerned about applying a restriction that could be undermined by unnecessary appeals to the courts. If someone chooses to breach the direction, their case will be heard in court.

Evan Harris: I remain slightly concerned, although I support the thrust of the clause, that the basis for not allowing the effective right of appeal is that the court system is too clogged and is nothing to do with the effectiveness of the measure. I do not think that it is reasonable for someone's right of appeal to be curtailed on the ground given by the Minister, which I do not necessarily dispute, that people might take advantage of their right of appeal. It is a bizarre situation if the idea that people might take advantage of their rights puts pressure on the Government not to issue those rights in the first place. It is a dangerous precedent if it is extended.

Caroline Flint: I do not think that we are setting a precedent; rather, we are following the practice in other matters on which the police have the power to direct. If an appeal mechanism was put in place, it would lead to problems, as animal rights activists would be likely to appeal every direction not to return during a specified period. That is one argument: the other, as I have said, is that other police powers to  direct are not subject to an appeal mechanism, so we would be setting a precedent by introducing one. Having an appeal mechanism for the order-making power in question would be anomalous.
As I said, under section 69(2) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 the police have the power to direct protesters to leave land where they reasonably believe such people are committing, have committed, or intend to commit aggravated trespass. If, having left the land, a person so directed re-enters within a period of three months—the provision is similar to the situation that we are discussing—he commits an offence. There is no appeal mechanism for that. To establish such a mechanism would be to set a precedent. I am sure that the same arguments that I am trying to explain to hon. Members were used in the debates about directions on aggravated trespass.

David Heath: I am grateful to the Minister because I see the value of the order and I am not arguing against it. However, I am trying to apply a little judicial oversight. Surely she accepts that there is a difference between the power to deal with aggravated trespass on private land that she cited and the power to remove people from a public place where they would otherwise be entitled to be. The more apt analogy is perhaps with the power to direct dispersal from a designated area under the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003, which extends to a maximum of only 24 hours, not three months.

Caroline Flint: Yes, I understand, but we are also discussing the context in which a police officer might use a direction. As I explained, a police officer would apply a number of different benchmarks to determine that a direction should be issued in the first place. The impact on the residents and their concerns would be taken into account.
We are talking about a situation in which families on their own property, experience such things as sabotage in the middle of the night—I shall not list all the things that animal rights extremists get up to, as we have discussed that already. They can then face individuals or groups, perhaps with placards and drums, mounting a vigil outside their door. However, the very presence of such people there is a serious matter. An individual might throw acid on someone's car and 24 hours later a vigil might appear, with people urging that person to stop doing something that is legal. I know that the hon. Gentleman does not disagree about that combination of harassment. There is a need to give the police effective powers. 
Although the offence we propose is not exactly the same as aggravated trespass on land, we would be setting a precedent if we put in place an appeal mechanism when there is no such mechanism for similar laws.

David Heath: I understand the Minister's point and I am not trying to pick an argument. The judicial supervision point is important, but other factors need to be taken into account. She has said that the means of appeal is the enforcement mechanism in breach—in other words, if an order is placed on someone and they breach it, they are taken to court and given the  opportunity to argue the case. However, I am not sure that there is a defence that the order should not even have been made. The person brought before the court either has breached the order or has not.
I would be happier if there was at least the capacity to argue in court that the police officer was mistaken in issuing the order in the first place, either through incorrect identification of the individual in question, or because the officer was exceeding his powers. At present there is such no provision. The policeman makes the order; someone who breaches it will be found guilty, but there is to be no judicial oversight of whether the order was made properly in the first instance.

Caroline Flint: But the same applies to aggravated trespass on land. The police officer makes the direction and there is no appeal mechanism. If someone breaches that direction, they will have their day in court, where they can say why they breached the direction. We might have to agree to differ on the issue. Directions can take many forms, but given the processes through which a police officer must go to determine whether to issue a direction, I do not want us to apply an appeal mechanism in this instance when one does not apply in others. Although the directions are not the same, there are good comparisons to be made between them.
New clauses 18 to 23 deal with concerns about confidentiality. I understand those concerns. As I hope to explain, there has been some confusion about people having to disclose their names and home addresses on various registers. We have sought the advice of our DTI colleagues on the issue and I have had to take a crash course on company law with them. There is no need for any member to give a home or business address and many use P.O. boxes or something similar. Again, one of the problems has been communication and information—knowing which companies might be under threat and therefore which people need to know that they can take such steps. Some of the companies that are directly involved in animal research are very aware of the different ways in which the law can protect them, but problems have emerged when more arm's-length companies supply the company involved in the research—the parent company, as it were. So, measures already exist. It is also common for shares to be held through nominees, and in such cases it is the nominee's details that are public. We do not feel that it is necessary to provide for the statutory protection of information that is not required. 
On new clause 20, the Law Commissions have fully considered the position of secured lenders, and we are awaiting the recommendations of the Law Commission for England and Wales. I understand that it is likely to propose that the contact details of a lender's agent may be filed in place of the lender's details. New clause 18 is unnecessary because company members are not in the same position as their directors. We introduced confidentiality orders for directors because they generally have to provide their  forename, surname and residential address for the public record, but the requirement for company members is not so specific; it merely requires their names and addresses, but they do not need to give their home address, and, as I said, a P.O. box number would do. 
Keeping members' addresses off the public record raises certain issues, including some relating to corporate governance, as my DTI colleagues informed me. It is important that those who own a company engage thoughtfully in its operation and exercise the responsibilities of ownership, as well as take dividends. As part of that role, it is important that members are able act together, which means that they must be able to contact one another—for example, they may need to collect signatures to propose a resolution at an annual general meeting, and how they vote on resolutions may have far-reaching implications for many others. The independent company law review consulted widely and concluded that any solution to the problem of people abusing the public availability of companies' registers of members should not interfere with members' rights or otherwise damage the proper use of registers or the information in them.

Jonathan Djanogly: Can the Minister confirm whether the review considered the implications in terms of extremist activity of access to the register? I would suggest that it did not; it was looking at other things.

Caroline Flint: I will check that, but the issue has been incorporated into the review, which is now looking into how such things might help the company law reform Bill, which the Government are hoping to introduce. It has certainly considered issues of confidentiality.
Confidentiality orders provide that directors do not have to seek an order to be protected, but can simply provide something like a P.O. box number, as can members. That would actually negate the need for confidentiality orders, because people will simply be able to say that they want a P.O. box address, which helps. That will apply to everyone, whatever the situation with regard to animal rights extremists. On a practical note, there are issues about the consideration of millions of separate applications for members' confidentiality orders, which would obviously be a very bureaucratic task. They certainly could not be handled by the handful of people who operate the current system for directors' confidentiality, but that difficulty would be negated by the fact that neither directors nor members will have to go through that process, but can simply have a P.O. box number, as I said. We believe that new clause 19 is unnecessary because members can already keep their home addresses off the public record. Companies do not need the right to make their members' addresses secret. 
On new clause 20, the public record of details of companies' secured borrowing was introduced to protect creditors, particularly unsecured ones, and there has been careful consideration of any proposal that might increase their commercial risk. The Law Commission for England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission recently examined aspects of the law  on secure lending, including registration requirements. In view of the potential risk of lenders being intimidated, we asked both commissions to consider what, if any, lenders' details should be on the public record. The Scottish Law Commission recommended that the text of the deed of a floating charge, which will include the lenders' details, should be registered,. The Law Commission for England and Wales has not yet reported, but both commissions advise that very few respondents to their consultations, and notably no lenders, believe that the details of the person taking securities should be protected. In the case of a charge over land, the information would still appear on the land register, as would charges over ships, aircraft and any other asset for which there is a specialist register. The DTI is considering the report, which, if there are still concerns, might provide an opportunity to raise the matter in relation to the company law reform Bill, on which the DTI will lead.

Jonathan Djanogly: May I make the same point as before? The reviews are considering other areas of the law. I hear what the Minister says, and I agree that she may be making an important point, but the people who are asked to give responses should be asked to give their views in the context of access by terrorists, about which they may not be thinking.

Caroline Flint: I will check with my DTI colleagues, but I guess that several organisations—certainly those that have lobbied me and others on what the Home Office should be doing about law enforcement and the policing of animal rights extremists—will look to other Departments to determine whether any other aspects of legislation affect their members. As the hon. Gentleman knows, my noble Friend Lord Sainsbury has worked closely with me to tackle animal rights extremism. I understand that the review considered extremism towards company directors, but I will double check if the hon. Gentleman needs any more reassurance. We have been working very closely together across Departments, and it would be rather strange if Lord Sainsbury and outside organisations had not been mindful of that matter.
It is not entirely clear what new clause 21 would achieve. It is clearly intended to provide another, perhaps easier, route to obtaining a confidentiality order where one is already in force, but, for the reasons that I gave for resisting other amendments, I am not sure if the new clause is really necessary. 
New clause 22 is difficult. I have had discussions with DTI officials about it. It is intended to expunge information from the public record that is already there, but it is a fact of life that once information has been made public, it is public for ever: it can be found in libraries and various other places where people can gain access to information. However much we may regret that fact, I am not sure that statute law can change it. The forthcoming company law reform legislation will make it much easier for company directors to keep their home addresses out of the public record, and all directors will be entitled to file a  service address for the public record. Much as we might like to remove information from existing records, I am not sure that it is possible. Legal issues are involved that might be important in other proceedings or actions taken against individuals. Again, it comes down to a balance between questions of confidentiality, with which I totally sympathise, and matters of corporate governance. 
I fully understand the concerns expressed through new clauses 26 and 32. Much of what we have been discussing today has been about the protection of individuals but we are aware also of the need to protect the corporate body from the damage done by animals rights extremist to those companies that, I repeat, are engaged in legal, lawful activity, using animals in science and research in what is one of the most regulated areas in the world. I am sympathetic to the problem. 
We have been working hard across Government to identify a clause that includes an offence linked to economic damage. We have had to work through a number of issues. The first is how to create such an offence that still allows people who want to protest legitimately against a company or an organisation to do so. There are plenty of examples of such protest from the past and from today and protest should continue to be allowed. Mention was made of other campaigns, such as that the one against apartheid and environmental campaigns, but the list is endless. We have had to think seriously about how to legislate without creating a disproportionate response and stopping people using their democratic right to protest in a law-abiding way. 
That is one issue, but there are others. For instance, new clause 32, tabled by the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon, would allow the offence to be applied only once the company had decided to stop trading. We do not necessarily want to reach that point. Hon. Members might want to think about how to create an offence that can be used before a company decides to stop trading—a supply company that decides to stop working for Huntingdon Life Sciences, or a company that decides to stop its activities entirely. We do not necessarily want take action only after the event, because that would not stop undue and illegal pressure being put on such companies. 
Other issues are highlighted in both new clauses. For instance, going back to my first point, the question is whether the provision should be restricted to the groups involved in animal science and research identified in new clause 32 or whether it should be broader. The Government are still thinking about that important point. However, we are taking legal advice and hope to table amendments on Report. I understand that the nature of the offence that we are talking about is groundbreaking in legal terms, so I offer Opposition Front-Bench Members the opportunity to meet me on Report to talk through the clause.

Evan Harris: The Minister's offer is helpful to us and we are grateful for it. We understand what the Minister says about the provision being groundbreaking—I think that that was her term—and the need to proceed with caution. I recognise also that she will not say which way she is minded in respect of a restricted activity or a wider provision. However, it would be useful if at this point, without coming down on either side of the argument, she shared her views about the advantages and disadvantages of each of those approaches.
I tabled the new clause for public debate; I could otherwise have had a private chat about the issue. Perhaps the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Djanogly) could, too. I know that the Minister has not made up her mind, but if she explained the issues, that would help to inform Report stage.

Caroline Flint: I think that I have been generous in discussing this aspect—that is why I have offered Opposition Members the opportunity to see me to discuss the issues. We will have a debate; the hon. Gentleman should not worry about it. There will be a debate on Report and, of course, in the other place. I think that I have been very open in sharing with the Committee today some of the complexities that are involved in this matter.
There are complexities, too, in the term ''connected persons'', for the reasons I explained earlier. They could be people such as a niece or an aunt, or people involved socially with those directly involved. 
I hope that hon. Members will not press their amendments and new clauses. We take the issue seriously—and not just in relation to the Bill. We have been working hard to ensure that the current law is used to its utmost and to improve the relevant mechanisms through, for example, the national extremism tactical co-ordinating unit. The police, the CPS and the judiciary are fully aware of the nature of the activity that we are talking about and how serious it is to the individuals and companies concerned and to the country as a whole.

Jonathan Djanogly: The Minister has clarified the points on which I requested clarification, and I thank her for that.
We have spent a lot of time on the clause, and I do not intend to take up much more. The Minister's expressed sentiments are certainly in favour of dealing with the problem and I respect that. The question is whether action will be taken that stops the extremism. Proposals and laws have been introduced before, but the problem is as bad as ever—in many ways worse. 
I want to look on the bright side and be positive, but during the lunch break my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) and I attended Solicitor-General's Question Time. The Solicitor-General was asked whether animal rights terrorism was being prosecuted and my hon. Friend pressed the question whether the special prosecutors promised nearly a year ago had been provided. The Solicitor-General's response was that the process was still under way. That  is what happens consistently with regard to dealing with animal rights extremism. We shall simply have to see how we progress. 
The Bill will, in our opinion, do much to counter extremist activity, particularly against individuals and particularly against those individuals in their homes. We support that. However, the Bill fails to attend to the task of securing the position of companies. The Government seem to fail to appreciate that by defending companies they would be defending their employees. I disagree with a lot of what the Minister said about shareholders' registers. The average shareholder will not use an alias or a nominee service. Anyone who had shares in HLS could not have used a nominee service because no nominee would have acted for HLS. I believe that a context system would be possible, but the Minister helpfully suggested a P.O. box solution.

Caroline Flint: As I understand it, shareholders can already use P.O. box addresses. One of the problems has been that they have not been aware that they can do that. That is why I have said that we do not need legislation for such people, we need to ensure that they are aware of what they may do. In future, it will be the norm for directors, instead of going through confidentiality orders, to avail themselves of a P.O. box address.

Jonathan Djanogly: The Minister is quite right. That is the case in relation to members. In relation to directors and to mortgagees, changes will be required, and I understand that changes are being considered. However, I first wrote to her Department—and to the DTI, as it happens—about four years ago, yet here we are, still talking about it. Perhaps there will soon be some kind of action.
After four years of campaigning on the issue, I am truly delighted to hear the Government say that they will review the position on economic damage. That is a tremendous thing to hear. However, one swallow does not make a spring. Until the Government actually present us with a clause and a strategy to deal with economic damage, we will pursue new clause 26. I am grateful for the Minister's offer of a meeting to discuss the proposed clause and I will certainly take her up on that. If we can sort something out before Report stage, that will really be fantastic. However, I shall wait to see that happen. 
On the basis of the Minister's response, I shall not press any of the amendments tabled by my hon. Friends and myself, other than new clause 26, on which I will request that the matter be put to a vote at the appropriate time. That will provide an indication that the Conservative party does not accept the economic intimidation of companies and will make it clear that the next Conservative Government will address the issue directly.

Evan Harris: I am grateful to the Minister for having clarified the points raised by my probing amendments, and I am satisfied with her answers. In respect of the amendments on directors' and shareholders' confidentiality, I think that the hon. Member for Huntingdon made some important points. I, too, am  not convinced that they can be wholly addressed by an awareness-raising exercise that puts the onus on the shareholder. We shall consider our position on such amendments for later stages of the Bill.
Before I come to new clause 32, I should like to clarify another point. After I spoke, the hon. Gentleman was rather critical of the Government's position, and the Government rather objected to the tone or the content, or both—

Jonathan Djanogly: The tone.

Evan Harris: Was it the tone? Right. I suspect that it was the content, too, because I am not sure that the Minister pleaded guilty. It is worthwhile to an extent to come to the aid of the hon. Gentleman, who has similar concerns. The point that I was trying to make is that the Home Office and the DTI, particularly the DTI, are fully apprised of the situation and are keen to make progress. DTI Ministers have been extremely supportive of businesses based in my constituency and of the university. That is not the same as saying that it was inevitable that we should be in this situation. Some actions that are being taken now could have been taken some time ago. There has been a pattern of such activity and only recently have the correct police structures been introduced. That is no criticism of the Minister—from the moment she took up her position, we saw rapid progress on appointments.
We could go further back and look at the Labour party's decision to withdraw its investment from Huntingdon Life Sciences on the basis that it thought that its work was unethical. I know that that is not the Government's responsibility—it is not responsible for the Labour party or, indeed, sometimes, the other way round. Nevertheless, that was a bitter blow, as I know from speaking to people at HLS, because it gave the imprimatur of political approval to that sort of approach. In saying that the current office-holders are doing a good job, I want to associate myself partly with the remarks that some criticism can be made of what happened previously. 
I appreciate the offer of a meeting with the Minister in respect of new clauses 32 and 36. I hope we will be properly consulted, rather than presented with an approach at the meeting on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. I am sure the Government feel that they have a majority for this measure. The point of tabling the amendments in Committee was to advance the debate. I am grateful for the Minister's clarification on dealing with things before they become a problem. It may be the words ''seeks to induce'' need to be inserted in new clause 32. I understand the Minister's point about the list of connected persons not covering fully all those who may need to be covered, using the example of the niece in the pub in the north-west. The new clause may not be perfect in that respect 
There are still issues around the broader provision. The more I think about that, the more difficult it will be for my colleagues and me to be persuaded that there is a basis to go further than legislation restricted at this point to animal rights extremists. There may be a  middle way, whereby secondary legislation requiring affirmative action by both Houses could be used to add to a list of areas where there is regulation, and so on. I was hoping we could have that debate today on the record, at least generally, but we have not been able to do so. 
On the basis of what I have said, it may be difficult for us to support new clause 26, even though we sympathise with the reasons behind it. The hon. Member for Huntingdon indicated he wanted a vote, and we do not want to pre-empt the discussion we want to have, nor any decision, about whether the legislation should be extended. In view of the fact that the Government are seeking to engage with us on the question of animal rights extremism and economic damage, it is not our intention at this point to press our new clause to a vote. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment. 
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
Clause 116 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Clauses 117 and 118 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 119 - Racial and religious hatred

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Marion Roe: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part. 
No. 327, in schedule 10, page 178, line 29, leave out 'RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS HATRED' and insert 
 'HATRED OF RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS'. 
No. 328, in schedule 10, page 178, line 32, leave out 
'hatred' 
and insert 
'group'. 
No. 323, in schedule 10, page 178, line 34, leave out from 'Part' to end of line 36 and insert 
'''religious group'' means a group of persons defined by reference to their religion or belief'. 
No. 322, in schedule 10, page 178, line 35, leave out 
'religious belief or lack of religious belief' 
and insert 
'their religion or belief'. 
No. 330, in schedule 10, page 178, line 37, leave out 
'racial or religious hatred' 
and insert 
'acts intended or likely to stir up hatred against racial or religious groups'. 
No. 331, in schedule 10, page 179, line 1, leave out 'racial or religious hatred' and insert 
'hatred against racial or religious groups'. 
No. 226, in schedule 10, page 179, leave out lines 3 to 7. 
No. 312, in schedule 10, page 179, line 4, leave out 
'having regard to all the circumstances'. 
No. 332, in schedule 10, page 179, line 4, leave out from 'circumstances' to end of line 7 and insert
'he recklessly risks that hatred against a racial or religious group will thereby be stirred up'. 
No. 313, in schedule 10, page 179, line 7, at end insert 
'or the person is reckless as to whether they are (or it is) likely to be so heard or seen or likely to stir up such racial or religious hatred'. 
No. 333, in schedule 10, page 179, line 10, leave out 'racial or religious hatred' and insert 
'hatred against racial or religious groups'. 
No. 227, in schedule 10, page 179, leave out lines 12 to 15. 
No. 314, in schedule 10, page 179, line 13, leave out 
'having regard to all the circumstances'. 
No. 334, in schedule 10, page 179, line 13, leave out from 'circumstances' to end of line 15 and insert 
'he recklessly risks that hatred against a racial or religious group will thereby be stirred up'. 
No. 315, in schedule 10, page 179, line 15, at end insert 
'or the person is reckless as to whether they are (or it is) likely to be so heard or seen or likely to stir up such racial or religious hatred'. 
No. 335, in schedule 10, page 179, line 18, leave out 'racial or religious hatred' and insert 
'hatred against racial or religious groups'. 
No. 228, in schedule 10, page 179, leave out lines 19 to 23. 
No. 316, in schedule 10, page 179, line 20, leave out 
'having regard to all the circumstances'. 
No. 336, in schedule 10, page 179, line 20, leave out from 'circumstances' to end of line 23 and insert 
'he recklessly risks that hatred against a racial or religious group will thereby be stirred up'. 
No. 317, in schedule 10, page 179, line 23, at end insert 
'or the person is reckless as to whether they are (or it is) likely to be so heard or seen or likely to stir up such racial or religious hatred'. 
No. 337, in schedule 10, page 179, line 26, leave out 'racial or religious hatred' and insert 
'hatred against racial or religious groups'. 
No. 229, in schedule 10, page 179, leave out lines 28 to 31. 
No. 318, in schedule 10, page 179, line 29, leave out 
'having regard to all the circumstances'. 
No. 338, in schedule 10, page 179, line 29, leave out from 'circumstances' to end of line 31 and insert 
'he recklessly risks that hatred against a racial or religious group will thereby be stirred up'. 
No. 319, in schedule 10, page 179, line 31, at end insert 
'or the person is reckless as to whether they are (or it is) likely to be so heard or seen or likely to stir up such racial or religious hatred'. 
No. 339, in schedule 10, page 179, line 35, leave out 'racial or religious hatred' and insert 
'hatred against racial or religious groups'. 
No. 230, in schedule 10, page 179, leave out lines 36 to 39. 
No. 320, in schedule 10, page 179, line 37, leave out 
'having regard to all the circumstances'. 
No. 340, in schedule 10, page 179, line 37, leave out from 'circumstances' to end of line 39 and insert 
'he recklessly risks that hatred against a racial or religious group will thereby be stirred up'. 
'or the person is reckless as to whether they are (or it is) likely to be so heard or seen or likely to stir up such racial or religious hatred'. 
No. 231, in schedule 10, page 180, leave out lines 4 to 7. 
Schedule 10 to be the Tenth schedule to the Bill. 
New clause 17—Racial and religious hatred (No. 2)— 
 'In section 17 of the Public Order Act 1986 (meaning of ''racial hatred''), at the end there is inserted— 
''(2) The threat, abuse or insults that are relevant for the purposes of this Part are not restricted to those that are expressly directed against such a group if— 
(a) he threatens those who hold a particular religious belief which is associated (wholly or partly) with the group, and 
(b) the threat is likely to stir up hatred of the group.''.'. 
And the following amendments thereto: (a), in paragraph (a) leave out 'he' and insert 'a person'. 
(b), in paragraph (a) after 'threatens', insert ', abuses or insults'. 
(c), in paragraph (b) after 'threat', insert ', abuse or insult'. 
New clause 31—Racial and religious hatred (No. 3)— 
 'An offence under part 3 of the Public Order Act 1986 (c. 64) (Racial hatred offences) may be committed where the intention is to stir up racial hatred even though the words used refer to a religious group.' 
New clause 33—Racial and religious hatred: procedure— 
 'Section 27 of the Public Order Act 1986 (c. 64) (procedures and punishment) is amended after subsection 1 by inserting— 
 ''(1A) Before consenting to the institution of proceedings under this Part the Attorney General shall consider whether, having regard to all of the circumstances of the alleged offence, such proceedings are likely to be consistent with the Human Rights Act 1998, Schedule 1, in particular the rights and freedoms set out under Articles 9 and 10, and the prohibition of abuse of rights under Article 17. 
 (1B) In particular he shall consider whether the act or acts of the proposed defendant gave rise to incitement to racial or religious hatred so as to be likely to imperil the safety of persons of a particular race, religion or belief as set out in sections 17 and 17A. 
 (1C) In reaching his decision the Attorney General shall take into account such circumstances as he considers to be relevant to the proper balance between the rights contained in the Articles referred to in subsection (1A), including the way in which any speech or other means of expression is conveyed, the content of such expression, and the occasion on which it occurred. 
 (1D) The Attorney General shall each year publish details of each and every request for a prosecution for racial or religious hatred, showing the racial or religious groups involved, whether a decision was made to prosecute, and the outcome of any such prosecution.''.'.

David Heath: I want briefly to introduce this debate because my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon wishes to address the numerous amendments.

Dominic Grieve: On a point of order, Dame Marion, This being a clause stand part debate, I thought that the Minister should introduce the Government's intention, so that we could then respond in the usual way with a debate.  Maybe it is too late to do so, but it would be a better way of going about things, with all due respect to the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome.

Marion Roe: I should explain to the Committee that I would have called the Minister if she rose in her seat, and I did not see her doing that.

David Heath: I also expected the Minister to rise to introduce the clause stand part debate, and, on the expectation that she will now do so, I am happy to resume my seat in order to speak later.

Hazel Blears: My apologies, Dame Marion, if I did not manage to catch your eye; perhaps it had something to do with the transition between my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary and myself.
It would helpful to speak briefly in the clause stand part debate and to set the scene, after which I will of course respond to the amendments in detail. We are dealing with a complex area. The words used in the amendments to the existing law that are set out in clause 119 and schedule 10 are fairly straightforward, but the arguments behind them are quite complex and controversial, and there are deeply held views on all sides of the debate. It is therefore important that hon. Members are able to express the breadth of the views that exist on such issues. 
In that regard, I should point out that we have not come to the clause afresh. The matter has been considered at length and in various settings over the past few years. The House of Lords Select Committee on Religious Offences issued a report in April 2003, following which a widespread consultation with faith groups was conducted to consider the implications of introducing the offence of religious hatred. The various faith groups then issued a joint statement in April 2004, which was broadly supportive of the Government's proposals, and did so again on Tuesday, in advance of this debate.

Evan Harris: I do not want to interrupt the Minister's flow, but it is only fair to say that not all faiths share the view of the statements that were issued by the group that she defines as ''faith groups''. One can always collect a group of supporters and say, ''That's the opinion of faith groups''. It might also be worth asking how much consultation on freedom of speech issues there was with people from a non-faith perspective.

Hazel Blears: I was not for a moment trying to suggest that there is universal agreement on the provisions, which is clearly not the case. There are a range of views, as the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon suggested. Humanist groups, atheists, agnostics and others with no religious beliefs have also raised issues, and their views in the consultation are of course valid. My understanding was that the consultation was wider than simply faith groups and considered a range of issues. We are trying to achieve the careful balance between freedom of expression and  people's right to protection from the kind of thing that goes on when hatred is stirred up against people in our communities. That balance is difficult to achieve and we do not pretend for a moment that there is one view on the matter.
Clause 119 amends the offences in part III of the Public Order Act 1986 relating to the stirring up of racial hatred, so that they apply in addition to the stirring up of hatred against groups defined by their religion. That will put an end to the unacceptable loophole in the law whereby groups with a common ethnic background, such as Jews and Sikhs, are protected by law from hatred being stirred up against them, whereas groups that are ethnically diverse, such as Christians, Muslims or Hindus, are not. 
Just as with the incitement to racial hatred, the new offence tackles a form of serious social harm. Stirring up hatred potentially causes great social unrest. It can and often does cause people to suffer abuse or to be afraid even to practice or profess their beliefs. The current law does not adequately deal with that problem. Those who stir up hatred may do so without inciting people directly to commit crimes. 
A number of relevant provisions are already operative, but the crime of incitement on such grounds requires something specific, which would not be covered by the existing law. There are some lesser offences under the Public Order Act, which provide redress where there is direct harassment or threats from one individual to another on the spot. I think that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield said in a previous debate in the Committee that if somebody was standing on a street corner deliberately threatening people on the grounds of their religion, the hon. Gentleman would be happy to support the police in intervening to prevent a breach of the peace. Those circumstances may well fall under the public order provisions. 
There are other circumstances, however, that are not covered by those provisions, which certainly do not cover targeting whole sectors of society and stirring up hatred against them. Those who stir up hatred are increasingly beginning to use religious identity as a substitute marker for racial hatred and to get round the law in that way. A range of amendments that we will come to later would link the racial hatred provisions with the religious provisions; no doubt when we come to explore those amendments, we will see the intricacies and sophistication of the matter. 
I want to make it very clear that this is not a new blasphemy law. I know that some of the arguments have connected blasphemy with the measures. Inevitably, some of the same arguments are covered, but this is not a new blasphemy law. The new offence covers stirring up hatred against groups that are targeted for their beliefs, not hatred against those beliefs. I know that sometimes that is a difficult distinction, but I want to be absolutely clear. The provisions will protect people, not ideologies. I think it was Trevor Phillips who said at a recent meeting that ''God does not need the Lord Chancellor or the Home  Secretary to be his bodyguard.'' That was a good phrase. The clause is about protecting people, not ideologies. It is even-handed.

Evan Harris: Does the Minister agree that if the provision is not about beliefs, it will not catch people who distribute material that sets out a range of insulting and inflammatory reasons to hate Islam, but will capture those who would do the same when it came to hating people of the Islamic faith? Is that a distinction that she would make?

Hazel Blears: Throughout this debate, we will have a series of examples posed and will be asked whether they would be caught by the proposals. The proposed offence is complex, with a number of different limbs; its intention, whether the words used are threatening, insulting or abusive and whether they are likely to stir up racial hatred in the people who would be exposed to them. The courts would have to decide, looking at all the different limbs of the offence, whether the different components were satisfied in order for there to be a conviction.
The courts would have to consider whether, in the circumstances presented to them, all the different limbs were identified. One of the examples that has been given to me is whether we should use the words Islamic terrorist. If those words were used in an academic debate or in a discussion about whether that was an appropriate phrase, hatred clearly was not likely to be stirred up in that context. If the phrase, ''All Muslims are terrorists'' was used in a pub by a group of drunken people, it may well be that those words would have the likely effect of stirring up hatred on the basis of that religion. I am not trying to avoid the issue, but it is difficult for me to say what a court would decide in those circumstances. It would be for the court to decide.

Evan Harris: The Minister says that she is not seeking to evade the issue, but she raised it. She said that the proposals will not affect hatred directed against belief, but are to protect believers. She will hear later that the Liberal Democrats understand her concerns. However, I asked her a specific question; from what she was saying, I thought that the difference between the two was so clear that people could be reassured. I asked her whether she felt that the measure would deal with people distributing material, setting out a range of insulting and highly inflammatory reasons for hating Islam, but not directed against people of that faith. I would urge her to clarify whether that is the case, as otherwise the point is that the matter can be clarified only in a court of law. A series of prosecutions will then be required to sort it out, and I do not believe that that is what she is after.

Hazel Blears: No, I am certainly not after a series of prosecutions. I have discussed the matter with the hon. Gentleman's hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome, and we certainly do not want to be in a position where the police are required to expend undue resources in looking at such issues. Clearly, any prosecutions will go forward only with the consent of the Attorney-General, who will have to look carefully  at whether it is appropriate for those matters to proceed. People would not be convicted if material were to be distributed in a way that was abusive and insulting, but was not likely to stir up hatred against people on the grounds of their religious belief. If, in those circumstances, hatred was likely to be stirred up, there clearly would be the realistic prospect of a conviction.

Dominic Grieve: Does that not highlight and encapsulate the absolute nub of the problem with the legislation? Words are perfectly acceptable when used in one context, but become unacceptable when transferred to another context. Once one has that qualification, there is no certainty for the individual as to the forum in which his words may or may not be acceptable. Furthermore, the Attorney-General will be constantly under pressure to bring prosecutions, which he will refuse to do. Thus, the law will be brought into disrepute, because many groups are clearly pinning hopes on the Bill, which, given the statement that the Minister has just made and others that we have heard, will never be fulfilled.

Hazel Blears: The hon. Gentleman must recognise that we already have provisions under the Public Order Act on stirring up racial hatred; clearly, the same provisions apply there. The court must apply an objective test to determine whether what has been said is abusive, threatening or insulting and likely to stir up hatred on the grounds of race. The court already needs to make that decision. In the Bill, we are seeking simply to replicate those provisions in relation to people who are defined in terms of religion, rather than race.
The hon. Gentleman may well take exception to court having to face the difficulty of looking at the separate limbs of an offence, but the position is exactly the same with the current public order provisions. In the past three years, 84 cases have been referred to the Attorney-General; we have had four prosecutions and two convictions, so we are certainly not in the situation of having hundreds of cases referred. Exactly the same limbs are relevant under the Public Order Act as will be relevant under the Bill.

James Clappison: The Minister is being generous in giving way, but is not there a world of difference between criticism of religion and criticism of race? It is difficult to conceive of a legitimate criticism of race, but it is possible to have legitimate criticisms of religion. In answer to the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon, will the Minister say whether it is possible for the offence to be committed purely through criticism of the religion itself.

Hazel Blears: The hon. Gentleman talks about criticism, but we need to be clear that we are talking about stirring up hatred. Hatred is a pretty extreme emotion. I looked it up in the Oxford English Dictionary, and the definition is ''intense dislike'' and ''ill-will'', so we are not talking about criticism. That is an important point.

Dominic Grieve: The Minister provided a definition of hatred; in the context of race, there can be no objective reason for hating someone on the basis of their race. However, the Minister's problem is this. Although we try to express ourselves moderately, there are occasions on which we try to foster ill-will towards other people. For example, attitudes in mainstream political parties towards extreme parties such as the British National party undoubtedly seek to generate ill-will against members of those parties; indeed, demonstrations against them often call on them to be ostracised. That is considered—subject, of course, to people not going out and hitting members of those parties over the head with a baseball bat—to be acceptable in a democratic society. I find it difficult, on a philosophical basis, to distinguish between that and trying to foment ill-will against a religious group with whose beliefs one profoundly disagrees.

Hazel Blears: I understand the point that the hon. Gentleman makes, and I shall not seek to caricature his view, but some elements in a religion may be similar to the campaigning and proselytising elements in a political belief; there is a blurring of that line. However, I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman, because it is appropriate to distinguish between religion and politics for two reasons.
First, for some groups, their religion is not simply a matter of choice. I have heard it said that religion is a matter of choice—as is politics, unless one is born into a particular tribe or political family—but that race clearly is not. There is an anomalous situation in that respect. Members of the Jewish and Sikh communities have protection on the grounds of their religion as well as of their race; the remarks that are made about them do not have to relate to their race, but just have to stir up hatred. The fact that those concerned are part of a mono-ethnic group means that they have protection. Those who do not fall into those categories, but who are members of a religious group do not have that protection.

Dominic Grieve: I disagree with the Minister about the characterisation of the Jewish community as a racial group. There might be a slightly stronger argument in relation to the Sikhs, but I cannot alter House of Lords decisions. We could equally argue that we should be using primary legislation to take the Sikhs out of being a racial category. They are, I agree with the Minister, quite a surprising exception, but exceptions just happen. If they are created by the courts, we should accept them.

Hazel Blears: I am sure that we could have another debate about the appropriate interaction between the Executive and the legislature in such circumstances.

Evan Harris: I understand where the hon. Member for Beaconsfield is coming from. However, my point is different. I am grateful that the Minister answered the question, and acknowledge that, in some contexts, saying things that might make somebody hate a religion or belief might be the equivalent of stirring up racial hatred against those who hold that belief. I understand the circumstances in which she might think that that applies.
However, what about people who think that a certain belief is evil? Some religions think that other religions are evil. Sometimes, it is a defining feature of a religion that its followers feel strongly about other people's religions, even if they try to get on as individuals. However, one can expect to hate nothing more than something that is evil. Therefore, if one believes that a religion is evil, does it not fall into the category whereby it stands a real risk of being prosecuted for inciting hatred against its followers? We are taught to hate evil. That is where the difficulty is in the way in which the legislation is framed.

Hazel Blears: I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman. He is seeking to elide two of the limbs of the offence. That is to say that words that are abusive, threatening or insulting against a religion would automatically constitute the offence. I have tried to make it clear that there might be words that are threatening about somebody's religious belief, but the second limb must also be present: the likely effect has to be to stir up hatred against individuals, not against the religion. Therefore, one can have the most deeply held views about a religion, but if one expresses them either with the intention or with the likely effect that to do so will stir up hatred against people who are defined by virtue of that religion, that is wrong. It should not take place in the kind of society in which we want to live, and in which we want to promote good and tolerant relations between different communities. If the hon. Gentleman and I simply disagree, we will find the issue hard to resolve, but I should not like him to elide the two limbs of the offence. That would be wrong.

Evan Harris: Let me have one more stab at this, because I know that the Minister wants to make progress and she has been very generous. The point that I was making was that the expression of what might be considered to be a legitimate criticism of belief might be so strong—that is what religion is: strongly held views—that it could have no consequence other than to stir up hatred; we are taught to hate things that are evil.
Let us take a cult, say Satanists, who might define themselves as loving evil. I am not an expert in the area, but Satanism is an evil cult, so is it not a reasonable thing for people to hate it, and therefore to hate its followers, without necessarily falling foul of this measure? It is reasonable for people to hate the followers of the BNP, but they should not take violent action against them—even though they have a set of beliefs that I think are hateful. However, there is a  distinction between that and incitement to racial hatred, as long as the initial criticism is of belief and not of people themselves.

Hazel Blears: I appreciate the hon. Gentleman's tenacity in seeking to put forward his point of view. I do not accept it. I do not think that it is impossible to express intense feelings without necessarily crossing that borderline into stirring up hatred against groups of individuals. He also failed to address the point that at the moment certain people have protection under our law and other groups do not. That is an important element of the legislation. That is why we tried to frame the provisions so that they were narrow and targeted at the mischief that we have identified. I know that some of his later amendments seek to widen the operation of the conditions. I am keen that in promoting this offence we try to circumscribe it so that it does not simply act as a catch-all provision, because I know that there are concerns about that.

James Clappison: The Minister is, no doubt, an extremely good and benevolent person and she can see the distinction between a religion and those who adhere to it, but the test is the effect that will be had on any person. She is making her case worse by the distinction that she is drawing between the two limbs of the offence. To people who are less well disposed than she is, saying that one hates a particular religion may well have the effect of making them hate those who adhere to it. It is a distinction that the courts will find extremely hard to make—if there is a distinction.

Hazel Blears: I have made the point that the courts and the Attorney-General will need to consider the offence as a whole, and to see whether all the separate components are fulfilled and it is appropriate to proceed to court.

Dominic Grieve: I am sorry to press the Minister on this point, but she is asking Parliament to pass a piece of legislation that will place in the hands of the Attorney-General the discretion, not to decide whether the law has been breached, but to decide whether a prosecution should be brought in a particular case. The truth is that the outcome will be that prosecutions will be limited to a minimum. Is it not in fact bad law? It leaves the average citizen totally unclear about what is and is not acceptable. It is unable to establish the boundaries of behaviour and it creates a climate of uncertainty. The law will be brought into disrepute. The pressures will build and be expressed publicly, with calls for prosecutions and for cases to be tested before juries when the Attorney-General will never grant permission for that to happen.

Hazel Blears: I was not involved in this area when the original public order provisions were passed, but I am sure that many of these arguments would have been raised at that time. It would have been argued that it was the Attorney-General who had the discretion, that he would have to see whether the limbs of the offence were fulfilled, and that people would not know what the limits of acceptable behaviour were. Yet over the  past eight years, since those offences were created, 84 cases have been referred, four prosecutions have been proceeded with and two have resulted in convictions.
It is fair to say that the vast majority of people in this country have a reasonable common-sense idea of what is acceptable and what is beyond the bounds. I think that it was Trevor Phillips who referred to the fact that Bernard Manning has not been subject to prosecution, despite some of the language and jokes that he has promulgated. Jim Davidson has never been subject to a prosecution. Clearly, robust satire, ridicule and humour are undertaken in these areas every day of the week, and yet we do not have the kind of doomsday scenario outlined by the hon. Gentleman. 
I have no doubt that these are serious and complex matters, but I do not share the misgivings that have been articulated by the hon. Gentleman because I think that we will have a common-sense way of proceeding with these matters and that the provisions fill a current loophole in the law. No hon. Member has indicated how they would seek to have a level playing field and parity for the different religious groups in this country, many of whom do not currently have the protection of the law.

David Heath: We have a few amendments down.

Hazel Blears: I will be brief. I just want to reassure the Committee that the threshold for the new offence is high. We need the Attorney-General's consent, there are various elements, and we have a subjective and an objective test—we will discuss that when we come to the amendments on recklessness, which will be interesting.
The final issue that I wanted to raise is that when the courts decide cases, they have to decide them in a manner compatible with the European convention on human rights, and two convention articles are relevant in this case: articles 9 and 10. Article 9 deals with freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and article 10 deals with freedom of expression. The court—if it gets that far after the matter has been considered by the Attorney-General—will have to consider both sets of rights and, where necessary, balance one against the other. The courts have a great deal of experience in carrying out that delicate balancing act and considering the way in which those provisions interact, and they will continue to do in this area as they do in many others. 
The provisions are necessary in order to provide justice and parity for the range of different religious groups in our society, and they have the support of many of the faith groups. I am sure that other hon. Members will refer to the people who do not support the proposals. I shall be more than happy to reply to all the amendments at the end of the debate.

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to the Minister for the way in which she presented the Government's case and for taking so many interventions. I shall set out as briefly as I can—because I am conscious of the passage of time—the reasons why I have such deep anxieties about the legislation. I then want to introduce new  clause 17, which is a possible way that we could consider the matter in a slightly different light, albeit one that I shall not press to a vote.
There are also numerous, very interesting amendments tabled by the Liberal Democrats. Although they would change the wording of the Bill, I am not entirely clear at the moment whether they would change the outcome. Doubtless, one of the Liberal Democrat Members will be able to explain them, and we can consider the matter in the round. 
I say to the Minister at the outset that I do not think ill of the Government in their attempt to legislate in this area—I am aware that they have good intentions. However, I am afraid that the road to hell is paved with good intentions, and in this case I am not persuaded that we are not taking a seriously wrong turning. I am open to persuasion, and if there are possible ways in which the legislation can be altered to remove its key problems I am happy to consider the matter further, but at the moment I remain unconvinced. I have a feeling that it is not an easy piece of legislation to amend in order to remove the problems. 
Let me return to what I said in my intervention on the Minister. Is it permissible to hate people? That is a good starting point for the debate because the Minister highlighted the fact that the race relations legislation had not led to prosecution of individuals for satire at the expense of the cultural values of others. Those were the illustrations she was citing when she referred to people such as Jim Davidson. That is not what the Race Relations Act 1976 was designed to do, and it is not what the Public Order Act 1986 was designed to do. 
The Public Order Act was designed on the premise that as people's racial characteristics are irrelevant—if I can put it that way—to their humanity and, as the Minister pointed out, are not of their own making, if one advocates hating someone on the grounds of their colour or race, one will fall foul of the Act. Indeed, I think the Minister will agree that the circumstances in which individuals have been prosecuted under the existing provisions for race are precisely where they seek to incite hatred of others because of their race, not by ridiculing or criticising cultural values that they may have. 
I return to the point that I made earlier about the BNP because it seems a wonderful illustration of the way democracy can work. Politicians express themselves quite frequently in terms concerning members of the BNP that show great hostility towards them because of their beliefs. Indeed, they go further than that and call on individuals to ostracise them. There are demonstrations calling for them to be ostracised. Those certainly do not fall foul of existing law. Public figures make speeches about those individuals emphasising the desirability that they be marginalised in our society, and that is considered to be part of normal political discourse. 
Indeed, it is quite successful. On the few occasions that constituents of mine who have extremist views have come to me, one of their complaints is that they consider themselves to be ostracised and it makes them angry. Sometimes their ostracism takes the form of their inability to book public meeting halls where they wish to hold meetings to peddle their views. All that is considered permissible. 
However, in the Bill, the Minister wishes to say that beliefs that come under a religious heading cannot be criticised in the same way. That is the nub of what we are discussing. I suppose that what would happen if the legislation is passed is that the BNP would declare itself to be a religious movement to get the protection of the law that it does not currently enjoy. 
We talked about mainstream religious faiths. I agree with the Minister. I am a Christian and a practising member of the Church of England. I can think of no basis on which I wish to revile or incite hatred towards those of other mainstream faiths, but as was rightly said by the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon, if devil worshippers set themselves up in my local community, made calls saying that they wished to carry out unpleasant practices, and wanted to get the law changed to sanction those practices, they would be likely to incite many people to make extremely intemperate comments. Is that to be prevented? 
Where is the boundary between comment that is critical and comment that seeks to reduce the quality of life of people who are the object of that comment? We seek to reduce the quality of life of BNP members when we say that they should be ostracised. People may wish to say the same thing about people in religious groups. So, the nub of the issue is that while, of course, none of us wishes to see Muslims, or for that matter Christians, subjected to vitriolic abuse, once we start departing from the principle that, short of falling foul of the criminal law by sanctioning violence against people, we should be allowed to criticise in strong terms, including expressing hatred for other people's beliefs, we are on a slippery slope that is difficult to stop. To my mind, it is difficult to provide a rational philosophical justification for why we can criticise the BNP in certain terms but cannot say the same about devil-worshippers, Muslims or Christians.

James Clappison: My hon. Friend is making a powerful case. A moment ago, he said ''expressing hatred for other people''. However, under the terms of the Bill, it is not necessary to go as far as that. Any words or actions that may be insulting are outlawed. As the Minister said, the point is the effect of the words on other people. The words may be only insulting but if they have the effect on any other person of stirring up hatred, that would bring the person concerned within the ambit of the Bill, even though what they had said was only mildly insulting.

Dominic Grieve: My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is one of the serious drafting weaknesses in the legislation. The reason for having it in those terms is, as the Minister explained, that the measure would be  subject to the Attorney-General's discretion. I am quite prepared to accept that in reality only cases of hatred will ever come to court.

John Mann: My point is not about devil worshippers, but about hate. The hon. Gentleman will recall Aneurin Bevan's comment that members of the Conservative party were lower than vermin. Will he comment on the words of one of my constituents to one of the hon. Gentleman's colleagues, who unwisely canvassed my constituent during the last election and received the retort that he would not be voting for him, even if he could, because he hated him. He called him, ''you Tory,'' then used a word that I shall not repeat here? He went further and said, ''I recall your father, and he was also a Tory . . . ,'' and again used a word not to be mentioned here. This definition of hatred is interesting, because my constituent clearly felt rather strongly about the hon. Gentleman's party.
Will the hon. Gentleman also say whether we are actually talking about incitement rather than hatred?

Dominic Grieve: It is clearly incitement, because that is what the Bill is all about. If someone calls someone else vermin in the presence of other people as opposed to in a one-to-one dialogue, the possibility of inciting other people to regard the other person as vermin must be present.
The hon. Gentleman's example delightfully highlights one of the arguments against this legislation, because when Mr. Bevan suggested that the Conservatives were lower than vermin, they set up the Vermin club. I have a Vermin club badge in my home, which was worn on a lapel around the streets. It shows a bug in a top hat looking toff-like with a cane under his arm. The badges were much worn in London in the months after the speech. 
On the whole, I believe that the individual who made the remark rather regretted it, because it backfired politically. It is one of the great protections in a democratic society that if people express themselves outrageously or intemperately and in a way that does not strike a chord with public opinion, there tends to be retribution against them at the polls and certainly in the media for what they have said. This was going to be my concluding remark, but that illustrates the fact that society is not without protection in this matter, because public opinion of and public opprobrium towards those who use intemperate language are probably just as good a regulator of the way in which people behave as legislation is.

Vera Baird: Before the hon. Gentleman finishes, I must ask him about his analogy between the BNP, political ideas and religion. Does he agree that there is an important distinction in that ideas are much more flexible? One usually thinks up one's political ideas for oneself, changes ones mind and adopts a different view. Very rarely are views inherited. Someone joked that there were some political dynasties, and I know that the hon. Gentleman's father was an MP. They are certainly not inherited as ideas en masse as part of a group's cultural heritage, but religion is inherited. If one insults an eight-year-old Muslim girl on the basis  of her Islamic faith, one insults her on something that is as inherently part of her being, as her race is, particularly at that age because she has not had the time to explore the possibilities of changing her faith in any way. It is for such mischief that the Government are seeking a cure.

Dominic Grieve: The hon. and learned Lady makes a perfectly good point. I do not want to widen the scope of the discussion, as we are straying on to very dangerous territory, but quite apart from any inherited political characteristics, there is evidence that we also inherit all sorts of emotional characteristics, although all that is tempered by free will and the ability to change their views that human beings clearly have. I accept what the hon. and learned Lady said, which was that in reality religious practice, if not belief, and adherence to religious precepts is conditioned for many, particularly the young—they do not have much option in the matter.
I take my children to church. That is not a matter on which there has been a huge amount of consultation, and doubtless there may come a moment when they tell me either that they will no longer go or that they will continue to go. That will be the point at which they start to make their own free choices, but I accept the hon. and learned Lady's point. 
I accept that the issue is difficult and there are no simple answers. That leads me on—I want to move speedily—to the question of the Attorney-General's discretion. I accept that there are other laws that are uncertain in scope. We give the Attorney-General all sorts of discretions on other matters and even encourage him to have them. However, I am worried that we are creating expectations with the Bill that will prove to be not only unfulfilable, but undesirable to fulfil. 
One recent example is the theatrical production in Birmingham concerning the Sikh gurdwara, which, on the face of it, was undoubtedly insulting. For a person of firm religious conviction, it is insulting for a play to suggest that rape takes place in a holy place that is associated with that person's faith and which furthermore suggests—I infer this, although I did not see the production—that there are cultural norms in the group frequenting that place that might encourage such a thing to happen. That would be really insulting for a Sikh. However, there was never any possibility of that production being the subject of a prosecution, even though the law clearly could have operated so as to bring such a prosecution, because of the Sikhs' particular and somewhat unusual classification as a racial group. 
To make a pragmatic comment, I foresee similar things happening concerning other faiths that could excite enormous passion and which could lead to similar calls for prosecution. Indeed, talking to some people from faith groups who support the Bill, I am alarmed to discover that many of them see such situations as precisely the sort of circumstances in which they would expect a prosecution to be brought. That worries me very much, because I think that we are deceiving them and I have said so. I do not believe that a prosecution will be brought in such circumstances  and that makes me even more worried about the nature of the legislation that we are putting on the statute book. 
I turn briefly to our new clause 17, which was an attempt to see whether there is a halfway house between the Government's position and my anxieties. New clause 17 attempts—I am always hesitant about whether or not I have succeeded—to identify whether it is possible to provide added protection to racial groups if, in reality, the threats being uttered against religion are clearly targeted against them, given the context in which they are made. New clause 17 is limited in its scope. 
I note the amendments that the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon has tabled. If they were accepted, they would reverse exactly the limited intention that I was trying to achieve in the first place—not that that would be necessarily wrong, but our intention is to target threats specifically. 
Threats are a key issue. It is one thing to insult or abuse somebody, and of course insults and abuse can threaten people. However, as the legislation operates it is not necessary to threaten somebody, only to insult or abuse them. Threats can be of a general kind—if I said, ''If we ever came into government we would deport all this religious group or deprive them of citizenship,'' or, ''We would prevent them from getting employment,'' that would be a threat, but such statements are different in nature and quality from being merely abusive. I put in the distinction because I thought that it might aid the debate. Let us not pretend that what I propose is a perfect solution; it is there simply to concentrate our minds. 
I want to give others an opportunity to speak. I may seek to catch your eye later, Dame Marion, in respect of the Liberal Democrat amendments.

Evan Harris: This might be a convenient point to mention what I was trying to do in the amendments to the new clause. I was suggesting not that the new clause was necessarily wrong but that the hon. Gentleman should defend why he talks about threat, abuse or insults in the first line of subsection (2) of the new clause, then ditches them. Secondly, there is a hanging ''he'' which is not sufficiently defined; that is what my amendment (a) sought to rectify. I wanted to ensure that the Government could not dismiss the hon. Gentleman's arguments on the basis of the drafting of the new clause. I was not suggesting that there was anything innately wrong in the approach that he and Liberty, which provided some of the wording, were taking.

Dominic Grieve: The hon. Gentleman is quite right. Liberty provided some of the wording. It has been extremely helpful throughout our debates on the Bill. ''He'' means ''she'' in drafting legislation, as the hon. Gentleman will know. I did not put in a person because I had not thought of corporate bodies being liable under this type of public order offence, but it is a  matter on which the Minister may wish to comment. As for the other points, I think that I have explained myself. I deliberately put in ''threat, abuse or insult'', but added the requirement that such statements threaten. There is a difference between threatening somebody and simply abusing or insulting them: a person may be angry about the one, but put into a state of fear about the other. I thought that distinction might have some merit.
As I said, none of my proposal is perfect, but I remain very doubtful and anxious about the provision. While I will listen carefully to the debate and reflect on it as we move on to Report, it will take a lot of persuasion for me to find a way in which I can support the measure.

David Heath: It is such a long time since I started my remarks on the clause—[Laughter.] I shall be brief because my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon has a large of number of amendments that he wishes to introduce. I shall simply give an overview of the Liberal Democrats' position on what is generally agreed to be the most difficult part of the Bill.
I start by saying that none of us on the three Front Benches differ over the intent—we understand what the Minister is trying to do. She is trying to cure a mischief in the present legal framework that, in effect, allows incitement to racial hatred to be carried out under the proxy of religion. It enables people to make comments that are essentially incitements against a particular race under the pretext that they are directed against a religion, which is identified with that race. As a result there is a difficulty in prosecution. We are sensible to recognise that the number of offences that are aggravated by race and religion since we passed the—I cannot remember the name of the Act—

James Clappison: The Crime and Disorder Act 1998.

Evan Harris: The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.

David Heath: I am most grateful to my colleagues. The number of such offences is increasing and we seem to be living in an increasingly intolerant age. I deplore that and like everyone else I am anxious to remove the potential for that. On that much, we agree with the Government.
The question that we are debating is not whether it is right to stop people abusing other people in such a way as to incite racial hatred through the proxy of religion, but whether the proposed measure is the right way to do it and whether it will accomplish what the Minister wants it to accomplish. More important—this is the crux of the debate—is whether the formulation that she has chosen will result in effects that are foreseeable but not intended in terms of its practical implementation. 
We can go further in terms of consensus in saying that although we may wish to stop this particular brand of incitement to hatred, we do not wish to stop people from either believing in or pronouncing upon their religious beliefs. We do not wish to stop people proselytising their religion in appropriate ways. We do not wish to stop people exercising the right of free  speech in drawing attention to, criticising, or perhaps ridiculing the activities of religious groups. We do not want to stop people telling jokes with a religious content. We do not wish to stop people writing plays or books, or engaging in learned discourse in forms which might, in a perverse way, cause some other people to form an adverse opinion of a religious group. That is the consensus. I do not think that anyone here believes anything else. 
The question is, does the Minister's proposal address that? I understand two things which are at the base of her argument. First, she says that the offence is aimed against inciting hatred against a group of people, not a religion. I understand that. I was brought up as a good west-country liberal non-conformist and we were taught always to hate the sin, but love the sinner. That is the message that the Minister is trying to get across: it is perfectly proper to be critical of religious practices but it must not be extended to inciting hatred of the people who follow those practices and who hold that set of beliefs. The second key element of the Minister's argument is the requirement for the Attorney-General to sanction any prosecution. Assuming that we have an Attorney-General who behaves properly, as the House would wish, there is a clear lock on any future prosecutions. 
That argument falls down on several points. First, there are huge problems of definition, which is a difficulty in itself. We have not managed to get to the bottom of the problems of definition in the debate so far. Secondly, there is a huge gulf in understanding of what the legislation means. I agree with what the hon. Member for Beaconsfield said: there are people out there who, whatever the Minister says, believe that this is a blasphemy law. I heard a Member of the House of Commons discussing the circumstances surrounding the play in Birmingham about the Sikh temple, saying that once the Bill went through the problem would be solved. It will not. I have heard others suggest that the Bill provides perfectly proper legislative provisions for dealing with books that are satirical or are considered to make adverse references to religious beliefs. It does not. Salman Rushdie will not be prosecuted under the proposed law as I understand it and as I hope that it is formulated.

Dominic Grieve: Salman Rushdie will not be prosecuted under the law because, presumably, the Attorney-General will not permit it. However, would he fall within the scope of the law so that he might be prosecutable? The answer must be that he would, by view of the response of those of the Muslim faith who were outraged by him.

David Heath: I am not sure whether the hon. Gentleman is right about that, but it is because I am not sure that I have such deep anxieties about the legislation. I am not sure that he is right because the test is not whether somebody feels that they are more likely to be hated, but whether somebody else is more likely to hate them, which is not quite the same thing. It is not the object of the hate who supplies the test of the efficacy of the legislation.
 ''In response to extremists within a faith community making repeated threatening statements stirring up followers to look for ways to make trouble for unbelievers saying that God would never ever allow unbelievers to be pleased with them and created them to be enemies.''—[Official Report, 7 December 2004; Vol. 428, c. 82WS.] 
If that is a tenet of people's faith, we are approaching the point where somebody who professes the faith of Islam will be the first object of a complaint and an investigation, because they have professed their faith. That worries me deeply, because I can envisage the measure being used in a perverse way. 
I can envisage the legislation, if it is passed as framed, being used by every person who wishes to put complaints to the police and start investigations. Yes, the cases will be dismissed by the Attorney-General in due course as not appropriate for prosecution, but such complaints could be made against everybody who such people feel has in any way disparaged their faith or written, spoken or made jokes about their practices. That will not be right, it will not be what the Minister intends, and it will not be the intention of the law, but that is what will happen. The first effect of such an outcome will be to make life extremely difficult for a lot of people. Secondly, it will disappoint a lot of people. Thirdly, it may have the perverse effect of leading to self-censorship by people who will seek to avoid causing any potential offence or any potential for anybody to bring a complaint against them. I do not believe that we should intend such an outcome. I hope that through sensible discourse in Committee, on Report and later we can reach a different form of words that will achieve the Minister's objectives. In its present form, I suspect that the provision will do a great deal of harm to the relations between different groups in this country rather than improve them. 
My last point is that other things need to be done to improve the lot of faith groups in this country. In some areas, measures against harassment and discrimination in day-to-day life will have massively more effect than the legislation—which will rarely be used by the Attorney-General to bring prosecutions—ever could. I hope that we will move back to that agenda if we are serious about dealing with discrimination, harassment and incitement to hatred of religious groups, rather than having well-meaning but misdirected legislation.

James Clappison: I rise to speak to amendment No. 226 and the consequential amendments that appear in my name alone. They are designed to remove some of the problems that have been identified with the proposal. Before that, however, I shall comment on the generality of the Bill.
The Government resisted those proposals—they came from Liberal Democrats as well as Conservative Members—all the way down the line. They seemed not to have a problem in drawing a distinction between racial and religious offences, and that gap in the law persisted for three years. By putting racial offences into an aggravated category unaccompanied by religious offences, the Government may have made the position of religious groups worse than it had been before the passage of the 1998 Act. In the end, to give the Government credit, they saw sense and included aggravated religious offences alongside the others, but there was no problem when that legislation was being passed of the sort that the Minister has described today, and that situation persisted for two years. 
What was proposed then was different from the offences that we are discussing today, because the concept of a racially or religiously aggravated offence applies where another offence has already been committed and where the racial or religious hostility aggravates the original offence. In most case, one imagines that the offence will be one of assault or something of a similar nature, but it could be any type of offence that has a religious or racial motive. However, another, separate offence has to be committed before the question of racial or religious aggravation comes into play. That is quite different to the provisions of clause 119, where we are talking about the creation of an offence in itself. 
I come now to the amendment, which centres on my concern about how wide the Government are casting the net. We have the Minister's assurance that prosecutions will be subject to the decision of the  Attorney-General, but I cannot take that assurance as seriously as I would like given the width of the net that Government seek to cast, particularly on the question of intent. 
We would do well to remember that the proposed offence is a serious offence, carrying up to seven years' imprisonment. It is important that the Committee considers the distinction between section 18(1)(a) and (b) of the Public Order Act 1986 as amended by the Bill, because there are to be two ways in which the new offence can be committed. New paragraph (a) deals with intent; the person concerned, the offender, must have the intent to ''stir up . . . religious hatred''. That is clear. Thus, religious hatred is slipped into the existing legislation. New paragraph (b) is an alternative, but it is every bit as serious as new paragraph (a) and the offence carries the same penalty. It creates an offence that can be committed in the absence of the intention to stir up hatred. New paragraph creates an offence where a person uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or displays material of that nature, and 
''having regard to all the circumstances the words, behaviour or material are . . . likely to be heard or seen by any person in whom they are . . . likely to stir up racial or religious hatred''. 
That is the effects test to which the Minister referred. However, the individual committing the offence does not have to have any intent of the type envisaged in paragraph (a), so the offence can be committed without the intent to stir up religious hatred. 
In passing, I notice that whereas new paragraph (a) involves merely slipping the word ''religious'' into the words of section 18(1)(a) of the Public Order Act, new paragraph (b) rewrites section 18(1)(b) of the Act. Why have the Government decided to make such a change in the wording paragraph (b), but not paragraph (a)? What is the significance of that change? Now, an offence will be created where, 
''having regard to all the circumstances the words, behaviour or material are . . . likely to be heard or seen by any person in whom they are (or it is) likely to stir up racial or religious hatred.'' 
I repeat, ''any person''. We would like an explanation of why that change has been made to the original wording. Is this another example of the net being cast wider?

Vera Baird: I note what the hon. Gentleman says about the word ''likely'' and the absence of any need for intention, and I must say that I have never liked that. Is not it correct to say that the wording in the provision follows exactly the wording in the earlier provision, except that that was about racial hatred? Is not it also correct to say that in all the other public offences related to threatening, abusing or insulting behaviour, ''likely'' is available as a test, unsatisfactory though it may be? Is not ''likely'' quite a strong test? It is not that if someone does something, certain consequences may follow, but that they are likely to follow. It might be hard for someone to be in a situation in which racial hatred is likely to follow without appreciating that. Might not there be a subterranean intent in there?

James Clappison: I shall come to the distinction between ''religious'' and ''racial'' in a minute. However, there are clear differences in the wording of the provisions in the 1986 Act and the new provisions. One is that, although the word ''likely'' is still used, but the wording of paragraph (b) in the Act was
''having regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby.'' 
The new wording is, 
''having regard to all the circumstances the words, behaviour or material are . . . likely to be heard or seen by any person in whom they are . . . likely to stir up racial or religious hatred.'' 
Some new wording has gone in and I think that the hon. and learned Lady would agree that the Minister needs to tell us why such a change has been made, and in particular why the expression ''any person'' has been slipped in. Does that widen the provisions? We need explanations from the Minister about all those things.

Vera Baird: I cannot explain for the Minister, although it is very interesting to work out what is going on. Is not the test narrower? The hon. Gentleman suggests that by changing the wording has opened the gate more widely. Hitherto, if someone did something that was likely to stir up racial or religious hatred, that was it. Now, under the new wording, they have to be within range of someone else—someone must be likely to hear or see something—and that person must be likely to be incited to racial hatred. Is not that narrower and more specific?

James Clappison: Something that is, say, broadcast or put in a book will go out to a very large number of people and the reference to ''any person'' might thus widen the potential offence because it includes persons of any sensibilities or propensities who might feel racial or religious hatred. However, we need to hear the Minister explain why the change has been made. Why not just stick with the existing wording?
My concern is that the new offence of inciting religious hatred—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Greenock and Inverclyde (David Cairns) will have a chance to make his own contribution, if he wishes. It is correct to say that the new offence of inciting religious hatred is qualified by the provisions of section 5 of the Public Order Act, which relate to the offence of inciting racial hatred. That states that a person is not guilty of an offence if he is not shown to have intended to stir up racial hatred—if he did not intend his words, behaviour or written material to be, and was not aware that they might be, threatening, abusive or insulting. Reading that in conjunction with new subsection (1)(b), it seems that a person could be guilty of an offence under that subsection if he was aware that his words or actions might be threatening, abusive or insulting, and their effect was to stir up religious hatred in any person. That is quite a wide provision. An offence can be committed without intent to stir up hatred, or without any intent at all—just awareness that the words might be insulting if they have the effect that is described.

Vera Baird: Is not the test one of recklessness—being aware of the risk that one's words will do something, and carrying on all the same? Recklessness is a very well grounded basis for criminal liability in English law.

James Clappison: The word ''reckless'' is not used here, the word that is used is ''aware'', referring to an awareness that something might be insulting. The words speak for themselves, and they pitch the offence very wide.
Religious hatred and racial hatred are very different. The argument has already been well rehearsed: it is difficult to see—in my view, at any rate—how there can be a legitimate criticism of somebody on the grounds of race, but it is possible to have legitimate criticisms of religion. As has been said, there is a severe risk that if we leave the offence as wide as it is, there could be a restraint on freedom of expression. We all share the objective of giving people protection for their religious beliefs and practices, but we also want to protect freedom of expression. The Minister spoke of maintaining a balance. I am not sure that the Government have got the balance right. I am not reassured by the fact that the decision is to be left to the Attorney-General. If the provision is too wide—if it is bad law—why make it at all, and if it is to be made, why leave its execution to the Attorney-General? 
I have a lot of concerns, and my amendment is offered as a way of improving matters. It is designed to narrow the offence and to draw a distinction between those who intend to stir up racial hatred and those who are making what they consider to be legitimate comment or criticism without that intent, but who are aware that they might risk unintentionally insulting somebody. The distinction should be made. The Government must explain why they have drawn the measure as wide as they have.

Evan Harris: We have had a long debate, but I tabled several amendments in the group. I shall try to speed through them, as many of them are of the same kind, and I shall not speak for as long as I planned. However, before I come to the amendments I shall set out my own perspective.
I have a big interest in the relationship between the state and religion, and a long-standing interest in the problems of racism. Racially I am Jewish, although my beliefs are entirely secular. However, I know that my secular views have not protected me from insult and, on rare occasions, racial attack on the basis of my Jewish racial origins. Therefore, I am acutely aware of the problems faced by people who suffer racial attack as a consequence of incitement to racial hatred. I include in that group not just black people and Jewish people, but people who are Asian who are Muslim. There is a major problem. My Liberal Democrat colleagues and I do not fail to recognise the problem that exists and the increasing problem faced day in, day out by the Muslim community who are victimised, first because of some of the media coverage, and secondly because of perceptions following 11  September. Their lives are blighted by unpleasant actions, from insult and abuse even to assault. 
As my hon. Friend said, the figures appear to be getting worse; there is clearly a problem with racism in this country. We cannot rely on the low levels of support for extremist parties to reassure ourselves, because research from the Oxford Internet Institute on behalf of the Joseph Rowntree charitable trust shows that about a quarter of those canvassed said that they would contemplate voting for the far right BNP. Sometimes people vote for parties without knowing exactly what they stand for, but there can be no doubt about what the BNP stands for; it is well known. I fear that in the run-up to the election and in the current world climate, combined with the problematical and sometimes disgraceful language used in relation to asylum and immigration, we are facing a potential danger. We owe it to people in the country to be extremely sensitive to those concerns. 
Although I have major objections to the wording of the measure, as my hon. Friend said we understand what the Government want to do and the concerns of groups—they include the Muslim community, but are not restricted to them—about the problems that they face. The question is whether the proposal is the best way of solving those problems, or whether it will solve them, or help to solve them, in a way that does not create new problems. As hon. Members have said, there is a better way forward, which we can explore now and on Report. 
I take a strong, secular view, which not all my party necessarily agrees with, and it might be perceived that that view is not in sympathy with those who experience the problems of racism. I campaigned for years—long before I was in Parliament—about the racism suffered by Muslim and Asian doctors in the health service, which is partly in statute, unfortunately. 
We all have examples. There was a proposal to build a mosque in my constituency and a lot of people, whose motives and objections I believe were wrong, were opposed to the prospect of a minaret on the Oxford skyline. There was extensive correspondence on the matter, and I had no hesitation in supporting the right of people to apply to have that mosque built, using the planning process. I have been a welcome guest of the Oxford centre for Islamic studies since that time and before then. 
I want to mention various problems before I come to the amendments. The first is the problem of definition—of recognising the difference between religion, which is mainly defined by beliefs, and race. Given that it is mainly identified by beliefs, if a religion is to be meaningful as a religion there must be a test of belief for believers; even though there can be an inherited religion, as the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) said, religion can be defined by a belief or, indeed, by the lack of it. There is difficulty in defining religion, in defining the difference between one belief system and other belief systems that are political rather than religious. It is incumbent on us to  demonstrate that there is sufficient difference between religion and race to show that there is a prima facie case for dealing with them differently in law, particularly if there is an alternative way of dealing with the mischief that we have all identified and are concerned about that may be more effective and less dangerous in terms of unwanted side effects. 
How is religion to be defined? There is an early-day motion suggesting that the court should have regard to the census as 200 different answers were given to the question about religion. In a sense, it is a matter of how long is a piece of string, because people can have religious beliefs that are consistent and clear but which are not shared by many other people. I do not know what the Government intend the courts to do to define what a religion, a cult or a sect is. The boundary between religion and politics is also extremely difficult to draw these days. I have difficulty understanding what the Natural Law party is about, and I have tried. Nevertheless, the members of that party would say that they have a set of beliefs around which they run their lives. The Natural Law party is also—the clue is in the title—a political party that has stood at elections. I do not know how the courts will deal with the issue if and when a case comes before them.

Vera Baird: I am following carefully what the hon. Gentleman is saying, but the term ''religion'' is used in our law already. We have already talked about religiously aggravated offences, so we are fairly comfortable that the courts will be able to decide what aggravation on the basis of religion is and that they can sort out what a religion is. The term ''religion'' or ''belief'' goes back to the ECHR, an article of which specifically declares religious freedom, although it also expresses limitations on it. There is quite a long history and reasonable precedents, including in our own law, on which we can rely to decide what religion is.

Evan Harris: I agree that the problem is already in our law, but having religiously aggravated offences does not necessarily mean that we are comfortable about the issue and that the courts have had the opportunity to deal with it or have dealt with it easily. I am certainly not comfortable that the courts would make the right decision even in those cases. An amendment on the amendment paper, which is starred because it referred to the wrong Act when originally submitted, suggests that if the Attorney-General's fiat is a good thing to avoid unintended prosecutions, there should be an Attorney-General opinion in respect of the relatively minor religiously aggravated offences under the Public Order Act—sections 4A, 5 and so on. I am not talking about religiously aggravated assault and criminal damage, because of the difficulties that the courts might have in future, particularly if we enter a climate of more religious conflict. I fear that we shall enter a climate in which there is at least more debate between religions, which is not a bad thing, but heightened debate may well lead to bad things.

James Clappison: Is there not an important distinction between a case in which another offence has taken place and a case in which the offence is criticising  religion itself, when that is an offence? For example, is there not a difference between punching a Satanist in the face and saying that Satanism is evil?

Evan Harris: I think that we all have to agree with the hon. Gentleman's point; I certainly do. It would have to be a peculiar person who treated both types of case equally. That is the point. There is a greater requirement to have clarity and avoid inappropriate prosecutions in relation to what we are discussing. That is why, to answer the hon. and learned Member for Redcar, in respect of these offences, which are defined solely by religion and do not rely on another crime to exacerbate them for the purpose of sentencing, the Government have seen fit to refer explicitly to the Attorney-General's permission to prosecute. As we shall see in relation to a group of amendments, there are arguments that that needs to be defined further. I know that the Attorney-General provision is already in the Public Order Act, but I think that in all the documents defending the decision to proceed with this legislation, the Government have relied on that, which suggests that they share at least some of my concerns about definition.
There is a difference between race and religion. It is perfectly possible and it is subjectively and, some would say, even objectively reasonable to describe a set of religious beliefs as evil or hateworthy. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield gave an example. We are all taught that evil is to be hated and wrong and that Satan stands for evil. However, some religions argue—some more strongly than others—that by definition if someone is not a follower of their religion they are damned in some way; they will go to hell, which is the repository for evil people who fail to see the light and repent. That is an interesting debate. I do not want to belittle those points of view, but that debate implies that strong words can be used about a set of beliefs that normally produce the reaction—a reaction that we are taught to have in school—that that is a nasty person. If they believe evil things, and sometimes, in their religious practices, do evil things that reject someone else's views, it is to be hated. The same applies to the BNP. I would not blame people who hated BNP supporters because of their views, so odious are they. 
In both those cases one can see that the person may intend, in pursuing their own religious beliefs, to label other religions as uniquely or generally not good, or indeed evil, and that will produce hate. It is regrettable. It is not the sort of thing that I want to get into, but we must ensure that people are free to practise their religious beliefs in that way. We must capture mischief in other ways, using existing offences, particularly where violence is involved, or the common law offence of incitement, where such language is used to incite people to acts, but not to opinions of others. 
I have received briefings on this aspect from a series of organisations. I do not think that I have ever said this before in the many debates about the reform of sexual offences, but I am grateful to the Evangelical Alliance—there we are; I have said it—for its briefing, because I agree with it that the Bill could act as a brake on its freedom to speak. However strongly I or others might feel about the Evangelical Alliance on a  religious basis or even, where it strays into that area, on a political basis, I do not think that anyone argues that it is a racist organisation. I have major issues with it on many of its views, but I do not accept that it is a racist organisation. If it is worried that its freedom of speech to proselytise will be restrained on the basis of saying that another religion is evil—I do not want to put words into their mouth, but it would not surprise me if some organisations wanted to say that—I do not see how its members can have the certainty that people require in law to ensure that they will not be prosecuted. I shall come in a moment to the indirect effects of the fear that there will be a clamour, almost a riot, of calls for prosecutions. 
There are major problems with this proposal that do not apply to hatred directed against people on the basis of race. For example, I have never heard people argue against blackness per se, but we always hear people arguing against a set of beliefs, such as Christianity or Islam—or indeed Judaism, although that is not so common these days. I can only summarise the point of view by saying that it is because it is different. That gives us a prima facie basis for trying to find a different way—certainly not this way—of treating it as if it were the same. 
Another major problem is the way in which the Bill will be interpreted. It will not only cause a fear of being prosecuted but a fear of calls for prosecution. People misunderstand the Bill. I have had a lengthy meeting with the Muslim Council of Britain, which is an extremely worthy organisation, because it can transmit a point of view on these issues with a great deal of experience and professionalism. I am grateful for the time that it has spent sending me information and talking to me. I have a great deal of respect for Iqbal Sacranie in particular, who I think merits that respect. I think that he now understands what the Government say people should understand—that the Bill is not about an extension of blasphemy. I am not saying that he does not understand that or that the MCB as an organisation does not understand it. However, until recently its comments suggested that it thought the Bill was the same as a blasphemy law. 
I shall read out some examples, not to attack the individuals concerned, but to suggest that if reasonable people such as them—with months and years of experience of negotiating such issues with the Government—believed that the law would cover what they thought it would, many people without their experience or insight, and without the perception that Mr. Sacranie now has, may well fall into the same trap. It is therefore important to read out these examples, and I am grateful to the Barnabas fund for providing them. 
The fund writes, 
''on BBC Radio 4's The Moral Maze on 14 July Iqbal Sacranie, Chairman of the influential Muslim Council of Britain . . . stated that he envisioned that under the new law any 'insult' or 'outrageous comments' about Islam or the Muslim community would be illegal, as would any 'defamation in the character of the Prophet Mohammed (Peace Be Upon Him)'''
because that would be 
''a direct insult and abuse on the Muslim community''. 
I have heard that view repeated by several people in recent days and weeks. If that is the perception—and I fear that it is—the Government have not succeeded in sending a sufficiently clear message about what the provisions will cover. That will have terrible results for public order—to such an extent that the Government may be defeating their own purpose in the changes that they are proposing to the 1986 Act.

Dominic Grieve: I agree with the hon. Gentleman, and I touched on the same issue earlier. I derived exactly the same impression from speaking to those people and to other groups: they seem to have a mistaken view of what the Bill will do.

Evan Harris: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for supporting my point.
Another example involves Samar Mashadi of the Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism, a website with which I am acquainted and which has a long record of working on these issues. Again, she is a strong supporter of the proposed law. On 16 October 2004—significantly after the Government had announced their intention to legislate—The Times reported that, in her view, under the new legislation: 
 ''People won't be able to say that someone of a different faith is going to hell. They will have to articulate themselves in a more pleasant manner.'' 
I think that people should articulate themselves in a more pleasant manner, but I do not think that we should have a law forcing them to do so. If people cannot say that others of a different faith are going to hell, a lot of people whose job it is to preach that sort of stuff will be left without much to say. I hope, therefore, that the Minister accepts that there is a misunderstanding about the Bill. Again, someone in a senior position in a Muslim organisation failed, at the time, to understand the issue. 
There are further examples. Hon. Members might remember the article by Charles Moore. In it, he simply hypothesised about someone saying something clearly unpleasant about the Prophet Mohammed. Iqbal Sacranie, in the rebuttal for which he was given space, clearly linked that insult to the Prophet and, therefore, the religion with the new law. That happened more recently than July; indeed, I believe that it was at the end of December. Iqbal Sacranie and, I hope, the Muslim Council of Britain now understand the Government's intention, but at the rate we are going, loads of people out there will still not have understood the distinction. 
By not repealing the pointless, obsolete, damaging, discriminatory blasphemy law that we have at the moment, the Government have failed to make it clear that we are not talking about another blasphemy law, and I hope that we shall come to that later in the Bill. The former Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Sheffield, Brightside (Mr. Blunkett), told the House of Lords Religious Offences Committee that he  personally felt that it should be repealed. The Government's failure to repeal it, however, having reviewed it in the context of the Bill, gives encouragement to those in other religions who feel that the provisions in the Bill are their version of it. 
I do not doubt that the words I referred to are insulting to Muslims with regard to the Prophet Mohammed, and I would not seek to use them, but the consequence of the belief in the wider world that the proposals will give people protection against insult to their religion is that there will be calls for prosecution. It may well be that the Attorney-General says no, although there will be political pressure. It may even be that if a prosecution goes ahead, the courts will say no. However, the problem will be that the people calling for restriction on free speech will be encouraged by the fact that they can point to a law, just as those people who protested against the broadcasting of ''Jerry Springer: The Opera'' on the BBC were encouraged by the fact that there was a blasphemy law they could call on. That is what laws do: they encourage people. The fact that the laws might be misunderstood does not stop them being encouraged. 
In the context of the strong feelings generated by insults to religion, we cannot simply regret that there will be calls for constraints on freedom of speech because it is insulting, but should actively play down the view of people of strong religious belief that they have protection from insult. We urgently need to tell people in today's society to cool it. We can ask people not to be insulting, but if they are, that is not an excuse for them to be intimidated, or for calls for prosecution under a law that does not exist. That is not what the Bill is designed to do. 
The problem then is self-censorship. What theatre, if it had a choice of two decent plays with artistic merit, would choose the one that might attract demonstrations by a group who believed the play was illegal because it was inciting them—unless the theatre thought that would attract custom, which is a high-risk strategy? There is no doubt that some Sikhs in Birmingham felt incited, but they misunderstood that this Bill is about the incitement to hatred of Sikhs in other people. Time and again, however, I heard people on the radio saying that the play was inciting them to feel hatred against the people putting on the play. That is a complete misreading of the law, but still the damage was done, and the police were unable to guarantee the safety of the people performing in the play. 
There are other examples. Salman Rushdie is in the newspapers again today, because it is unclear whether the Iranian regime is reiterating the fatwa issued against him, which was supported by a minority in this country. Self-censorship is a danger if the law is not introduced correctly, and I fear that it will not be, because of the way it is framed and understood. The way to deal with that problem—I hope the Minister will accept that it is a problem—is to frame any legislation to make it clear that it is about racism, and religion as a proxy for racism— 
Ms Blears indicated dissent.

Evan Harris: The Minister is shaking her head, but there is a strong view out there that that is the mischief she was trying to deal with. We should also make it clear that blasphemy should not be unlawful in respect of any religion. I cannot understand the Government's failure to deal with that.
I will deal briefly with the amendments, as they are relatively straightforward. Most of the amendments in my name and in that of my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome are probing, and it is not our intention to press any of them at this stage. There is a series of sets of amendments, through which I will go one by one. I am looking for the Government to explain where they are coming from. 
Simply to make the law clearer, one group of amendments seeks to define the terms ''racial hatred'' and ''religious hatred'' as ''hatred directed against racial and religious groups''. I know that the concept of racial hatred has been on the statute book for a long time, but if you ask people out there what racial hatred is, they are far more likely to find the question difficult to answer than, ''What is hatred directed against a racial or religious group?'' If Minister sees this as constructive, I wonder why the Government would not consider doing that to help make it clear what we are talking about, if we are unfortunate enough to see the clause become law. 
Another set of amendments encourages the Government to use a new definition of ''religious belief''—the one that has been used before. I have a briefing from Justice, which is an organisation that the Government cite as supporting the legislation. I understand that Justice supports the set of amendments that I have just spoken to, which redefine ''racial hatred'' and ''religious hatred'' as ''hatred directed against racial groups and religious groups''. It also supports my amendment to probe why the Government are using a slightly different definition of religion or belief. The briefing states: 
 ''The term 'religious belief or lack of religious belief' used in the bill risks omitting those who have a non-religious belief such as humanists. 
 JUSTICE believes that the use of the term 'religion and belief' best categorises the field to be addressed. This deliberately echoes the phrase used in Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) which has been defined by the European Court of Human Rights to encompass a very wide range of religions and beliefs including the right not to believe. It is both more appropriate and easier for the Courts to define if a common phrase is used in all aspects of the law relating to religion and belief.'' 
I should be grateful if the Minister would explain why she has chosen to use another form of words, and, even if she does not feel that the difference is significant, whether she feels that it would be best to make the terms similar. 
The third set of amendments seeks to probe the same area raised by the hon. Member for Hertsmere (Mr. Clappison). Again, the amendments are not necessarily seeking to improve schedule 10—I have strong feelings that it is beyond improvement—but I would like to probe the thinking behind the way in which the Minister rephrased, for example, section 18(1)(b). 
''having regard to all the circumstances'' 
is required, as opposed to the recklessness test that I set out. I have sought to point out how grateful I would be by tabling amendments that delete words. I am not convinced that my version is any better—indeed, it may be worse—but I should be grateful if the Minister would explain why. 
I suggested that there should be a recklessness test in section 18(1)(b). Perhaps 
''having regard to all the circumstances'', 
combined with the modern interpretation of intention, combined with section 18(5), would answer my question, but I should be grateful if the Minister would put an explanation on the record, as many people are concerned about the ''likely to'' issue. 
Further amendments deal with the Attorney-General's fiat, as it is called. New clause 33 is a serious attempt to suggest to the Minister how her provision could be improved. It sets out four qualifications to the existing fiat of the Attorney-General in section 27. The first qualification states: 
 ''Before consenting to the institution of proceedings under this Part the Attorney General shall consider whether, having regard to all of the circumstances of the alleged offence, such proceedings are likely to be consistent with the Human Rights Act 1998, Schedule 1, in particular the rights and freedoms set out under Articles 9 and 10, and the prohibition of abuse of rights under Article 17.'' 
There is a clear tension—a conflict—between the Government's provisions and the right of free speech, which I understand is not absolute. The new clause seeks to ensure that the Attorney-General is bound in statute to have regard to the articles cited in it. Again I am grateful to Justice, which has more expertise than I do, for suggesting the wording. I require the Minister to explain what harm is done by making the matter clear in statute. 
The second qualification states: 
 ''In particular he shall consider whether the act or acts of the proposed defendant gave rise to incitement to racial or religious hatred so as to be likely to imperil the safety of persons of a particular race, religion or belief as set out in sections 17 and 17A.'' 
That means that the issue to bear in mind is whether the safety of people is at issue, rather than something that in theory might be seen to incite hatred but without any likelihood of its being translated into something that might imperil safety. 
The Minister will accept that the clause simply requires that hatred be stirred up, even if it is powerless hatred. I am not in favour of hatred being stirred up, but that is one of the factors that should be borne in mind, and it is reasonable to put that on the statute. 
Justice's third proposed amendment would ensure that 
''the Attorney-General shall take into account such circumstances as he considers to be relevant to the proper balance between the rights contained in the Articles referred to in section 27(1A),''—
that is, articles 9, 10 and 17, as I said— 
''including the way in which any speech or other means of expression is conveyed, the content of such expression, and the occasion on which it occurred.'' 
The Government have said in answer to parliamentary questions that they will not cover certain things such as the telling of jokes. That may be their intention, but it would be more reassuring to those of us who are concerned about this if the Attorney-General could be directed to take into account the contexts to which I have referred in a way that would enable him to distinguish in law between a play in the Royal Albert hall and someone standing on a soap box outside a pub in Oldham and delivering a comedy routine. There is a contextual difference, and I believe that the Minister's explanatory notes and the Government's commentaries on the matter recognise that any decision on what falls under the law and whether it is prosecuted needs to take account of that difference. It is reasonable to ask the Minister to put that into statute. I also ask the Minister to include in the legislation a direction for the Attorney-General to publish details of his decision. 
I have two final points to make. First, as I said, there is a starred amendment designed to probe the Government's reason for not considering extending the Attorney-General's permission to prosecute religiously exacerbated offences listed in sections 4A, 5 and 6 of the Public Order Act 1986. It has not been selected for debate, but we can cover it within the ambit of clause stand part to explain why this provision on religiously exacerbated offences and not other provisions relating to other relatively minor religiously exacerbated offences is the one that is required. 
We have heard a lot about the rights of people of religious belief, but there is a separate fear that the entertainment industry will be particularly badly affected. That fear has often been dismissed by saying that, of course, it will not affect comedians, but there are reasons why it might affect them in a way in which, strangely, it might not affect preachers who use strong language about other religions. 
The words ''intend to insult'' are relevant here. It is a facet of some types of parody that there is an intention to insult someone's beliefs. That may not be everyone's cup of tea, and it will be quickly dropped if it does not get a laugh, but that is a form of comedy at the moment. Stating in law that intention is a key factor does not reassure people whose intention is to create a comic reaction through insult, because the joke will not work if it is not much of an insult. 
Although the Minister says that there have been no prosecutions of Jim Davidson or Bernard Manning, at least on these grounds, that does not reassure us in the current climate, in which members of various religions have said time and again that they have a right not to be insulted, that pressure will not be applied to broadcasters or places of to entertainment not to lay on these sorts of comedians with this sort of material, or plays for that matter. The indirect impact of this measure is therefore of particular concern to  broadcasters, comedians and other entertainers, particularly when it is combined with the Government's failure, which I cannot understand, to repeal the blasphemy law, which gives succour to those who believe that this is a blasphemy law. I hope that the Minister will not be too dismissive of those concerns. 
The Minister asked whether the Opposition realise that there is a loophole with regard to Jews and Sikhs. Assuming that there is a loophole and that Jews and Sikhs are protected from insult to their beliefs and not from insult to their race, which I question, and assuming that existing law is not wide enough, the measure proposed in the new clause by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield has some merit. It seeks to deal specifically with the mischief and make it clear to courts that, even if the wording is not right, they are able to prosecute and convict where incitement to religious hatred is used as a proxy or substitute for the incitement to racial hatred. 
I confess that the Minister has persuaded me that there is an issue that must be dealt with. It may not be clear enough to the police, prosecutors and courts that the existing law should be able to deal with the sort of language used in a clever way—if we like, reading the law—by the British National party against Muslims. I hope that she will accept that a form of words similar to those in the hon. Gentleman's new clause would deal with that issue. It might be considered that those people who are particularly worried about the issue would be satisfied without having to endorse schedule 10, which seeks a parallel form of wording for racial hatred. It will be difficult for us to support schedule 10 and clause 19. We intend to vote against those measures, although we have some support for the approach taken by the hon. Gentleman and others who have proposed similar amendments.

Hazel Blears: We have had a good debate, and a range of interesting points have been made. We have a series of complex amendments, and I will do my best to go through them in turn to explain to hon. Members why the Government seek to resist the amendments. Where the amendments are probing amendments, I will seek to persuade Members that on the basis of my reassurances, they should be willing not to press them. I am sure that I will not manage that in every case, but I will do my best.
The first set of amendments were tabled by the hon. Member for Hertsmere. He is opposed to the introduction in subsection (b) of the phrase 
''the words, behaviour or material are (or is) likely to be heard or seen by any person''. 
He seeks to remove those words from the legislation, but their insertion is not meant to lower the threshold, because in the legislation, we already have an objective test. We do not have legislation that necessarily requires intention; it requires either intention to stir up hatred, or the words, behaviour or material likely to stir up hatred. We are seeking to clarify the fact that the test is not dependent on a person seeing the material. 
That is a narrow example, but such issues have genuinely been brought to our attention, so we want to make sure that we can prosecute, because the law was never intended to work in the way that I have just described. It used to be the case that if one produced material that would have been likely to stir up racial or, in this case, religious hatred, one should have been able to be prosecuted. It is currently difficult to do that in some cases, and the Attorney-General has asked for clarification, because of the way that the law was always intended to operate.

James Clappison: What I wanted was an explanation, but my main objection was to the creation of an offence with the lack of intent. I accept what the Minister says, but is it not more likely that her new wording will have the effect that she has described? The words or behaviour will have to be seen by someone, which was not required before. Therefore, she is creating the loophole that she has just described.

Hazel Blears: No. It says that it is ''likely'' that the material will be seen by any person in whom it would be ''likely'' to stir up racial or religious hatred. Therefore, it does not have to be, but to be likely that it would be.

Dominic Grieve: Taking the Minister's earlier example about a poster being put up and taken down before anybody had a chance to see it, it would be easy to argue that such a poster was not likely to be seen by any person. I confess that I find the distinction difficult, so I do not see the merit of the change. Equally, I am not sure that it cuts the other way, in terms of demerit. I am at a loss to see the advantage of the new wording.

Hazel Blears: It has been suggested by the Attorney-General. His case workers have experienced difficulty in seeking to bring prosecutions in instances in which early action has been taken to get rid of racially offensive material, because it has been difficult to prove the two limbs of the offence. The main point was about intent, and I shall come to that when I deal with the recklessness provisions of the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon. I am assured that that clarification will be helpful in ensuring that the law can operate in the way in which it was intended that it  should. On that basis, I would ask the hon. Member for Hertsmere to consider not pressing his amendments to a vote.
The next series of amendments is in two groups, The first seeks to add to the offence a recklessness limb in addition to the likelihood limb, and the second seeks to replace the likelihood limb with a recklessness test. The amendments stem from a concern shared by the hon. Member for Hertsmere that offences do not necessarily require that the perpetrator intends to stir up racial or religious hatred, and that there is the second limb—the more objective test—that hatred is likely to be stirred up. Hon. Members feel that a greater degree of intention would be appropriate in order for the offence to be fulfilled. 
At present, a jury has to decide objectively whether the words are likely to stir up hatred. The effect of the hon. Gentleman's amendments would be to include a person who is aware that hatred might be stirred up by his words or behaviour but nevertheless unreasonably continues to use them. A key difference between that position and the existing law would be the need to prove the defendant's knowledge of that risk. Recklessness introduces a subjective element, rather than the objective test of the jury. It brings in a value judgment—the court has to ask whether it was reasonable to continue, bearing in mind that risk. Using recklessness in this context implies that in some circumstances it might be right knowingly to use words or behaviour that might stir up hatred. I do not believe that it is ever right to knowingly use threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour if they are likely to stir up hatred against a racial or religious group.

James Clappison: The Minister may unwittingly have imported the word reasonably into the legislation, where it does not appear. Apart from that, the mental state that the person has to have is to be aware that his words or behaviour might be threatening, abusive or insulting; that is all that is required. He has to be aware—he does not have to go on to foresee that religious hatred is stirred up, even if it is an effect of what he has said. So far as he is concerned, the only mental state that he has to have is an awareness that his words or behaviour might be threatening, abusive or insulting.

Hazel Blears: He has either to have intended it or to be aware that the words are threatening, abusive or insulting, and then he has to fulfil the second limb of the offence, which is that using those words would produce the likely effect. As I said in my opening remarks, every limb of the offence has to be proven; there has to be intention, or awareness that the words are insulting, abusive or threatening, and it has to be shown that the likely effect is that racial or religious hatred will be stirred up.

James Clappison: I will be corrected if I am wrong, but I am not sure that the Minister is entirely right. The mental state that the person has to have is to be aware that his words or behaviour might be threatening or insulting, but so far as the likelihood of producing religious hatred is concerned, he does not have to  foresee it. It might be a consequence of what he says, but his mental state at the time needs only to be that he is aware that his words might be threatening, abusive or insulting.

Hazel Blears: He has to be aware or to intend. Those are the separate limbs. If he does not intend, he must be aware. If he did not intend or was not aware, the defence in section 18(5) would come into play. The hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon is seeking to introduce an element of recklessness, which is not appropriate because that would require the court to reach a judgment on whether the defendant was aware that his comments were insulting, abusive or threatening and chose to carry on, and on the balance of whether it was right to do that. We are saying that if he is aware that his words are insulting, threatening or abusive, he should not go on to use them if the likely effect is to stir up racial hatred. That is what is in the provision. The hon. Gentleman's attempt to raise that degree of intention is not appropriate and that is why we are resisting his amendment. If someone is aware that they are knowingly using such words and if those words are likely to stir up racial hatred, that is wrong. That is the mischief that we are seeking to attack.

Evan Harris: What the Minister is saying is that a person does not have to be aware that their words are likely to stir up racial hatred. They have to be aware only that their words are potentially insulting. The provision could be tightened up in respect of religion to make a requirement that they should also be aware that a reasonable view would be that their words are likely to be heard by someone and to stir up racial or religious hatred. Can she explain what the problem is with taking the extra step in what she calls the objective test?

Hazel Blears: First, the position in existing legislation is similar—someone must either intend or be aware that their words have those qualities. Having passed that limb, there is an objective test from the court as to whether the words were likely to have the effect of stirring up racial hatred. That provision has been in legislation for eight years and has been interpreted by the courts in that way.
One of our concerns is that the amendments would make it significantly harder to prosecute the sort of behaviour that the provisions are designed to combat because the Crown Prosecution Service would need to show that the defendant was aware of the effect that his words might have. The defendant's awareness would be substituted for the objective test that the court would use. That would raise the threshold and make it more difficult to prosecute. Hon. Members will know that there is criticism of the Crown Prosecution Service for the very low number of prosecutions under public order provisions. I genuinely believe that the amendments would frustrate prosecutions against both racial and religious hatred.

Evan Harris: I understand the Minister's concern not to weaken the existing legislation on racial hatred and I am not seeking directly to do so, which is why I described my amendments as probing. There could be an architecture to make the qualification of recklessness as to the likelihood of stirring up racial hatred specific to religious hatred on the basis that it is more contentious. I do not believe that there was a debate such as this or similar objections to the provision on racial hatred, for the reasons that we have already heard. It could be argued that there is a need to have a higher threshold for religious hatred to ensure that people are not caught if they should not be caught.

Hazel Blears: That brings us to the core of the difference between those on this side of the Committee and the hon. Gentleman. He seeks to distinguish stirring up hatred against people on racial grounds and stirring up hatred against people on the basis of their religion and beliefs. I shall ask him a simple question because it might help us to clarify the matter. Why should people have hatred stirred up against them on the grounds of their religion? That is at the heart of the legislation. I shall come to that in relation to new clause 17 and the hon. Gentleman's other amendments. There is a big difference in what is being said.
The hon. Gentleman is saying that there is a significant difference between race and religion and that the provisions to protect people from racial hatred should be stronger than the provisions to protect them from religious hatred. That goes back to the core: is race a matter that is not chosen, whereas religion is chosen, because it concerns belief? There is a significant difference between the parties in the way our proposals are framed. We think that it is as wrong to stir up hatred against people on the grounds of their religion and belief as it is to stir up hatred against people on the grounds of their race. That is a fairly large distinction between us.

James Clappison: Will the Minister give way?

Hazel Blears: I am anxious to make progress, because we are under pressure. I am sure that such matters will be debated again on Report in great detail.
I turn to amendments No. 322 and 323. Amendment No. 322 proposes that 
''religious belief or lack of religious belief'', 
in proposed section 17A of the 1986 Act, in paragraph 3 of schedule 10, be replaced with ''religion or belief''. There are also consequential amendments to that proposal. There are three reasons why I want to stick with the original wording. First, there are other relevant criminal law provisions. As my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar said, there are already definitions in criminal law. For reasons of consistency we have sought to keep that wording. Secondly, the term ''religious belief or lack of religious belief'' is narrower than ''religion or belief'' and I am keen for the legislation to target the mischief that we have identified.

Dominic Grieve: I have no doubt that if amendment No. 322 were accepted, the provisions would extend to the views of the BNP—or, indeed, my views or the Minister's.

Hazel Blears: I was about to say that we would probably have unhelpful legal battles about whether ideologies such as Marxism fell into that category. That is not territory on which we want to trespass. The third reason is that we want to tackle the mischief of which we have become aware.
The hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon mentioned humanists and atheists, which I think are adequately covered by the term ''lack of religious belief'', rather than simply ''belief''. The legislation will protect such groups from the stirring up of hatred against them on the grounds of their lack of belief. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will feel that the legislation is properly targeted and that if it were extended to belief in general, we would be on even more controversial territory. 
Several amendments would change the title of several provisions from ''racial or religious hatred'' to ''hatred against racial or religious groups''. We tried to make it clear in the explanatory notes that we want to protect groups of people rather than ideologies. However, there is merit in what the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon says, so I ask him not to press the relevant amendments on the understanding that we will give the matter further consideration before Report. Hon. Members have pointed out that we need to make it very clear in our communications to people exactly what the legislation covers and what it does not cover, so that we do not run the risk of people bringing unnecessary prosecutions. I undertake to do that by Report stage. 
Amendment No. 222 would remove clause 119, to be replaced by new clause 17. The alternative version from the Liberal Democrats is new clause 31 and there are similarities between the two proposals—they are trying to get to the same place. New clause 17 would amend part 3 of the Public Order Act, so that people who held a particular religious belief would be protected by the offence of incitement to racial hatred, if their religious beliefs were associated with a racial group. That is the key phrase. New clause 17 is unnecessary because part 3 of the Public Order Act already refers to the intention to stir up racial hatred. It does not matter if the words used are not racist words. Under the Public Order Act, the words could be religious words in relation to those people who qualify because they are from a mono-ethnic background. If Jews or Sikhs were involved, the words would not need to be about their race—they could be words about their religion. The proposal from the hon. Member for Beaconsfield therefore does not take us any further from where we are now. It is designed simply to address the gap that has been identified, whereby religion is used a proxy for race. That is part of what we want to do, but new clause 17 does not address that further territory, which is a real problem that we want to address.

Dominic Grieve: I think that new clause 17 does take us slightly further, because it identifies religion as one of the potential hallmarks of a racial group, whereas the previous legislation did not. That is the point at which the Minister parts from us. The Bill as drafted goes too far. My proposal aimed to see whether there was a sensible point at which there was a meeting of minds. If the Minister does not see that as a good departure point, I suspect that it highlights what I said when I spoke originally, which is that it is difficult to see how the legislation can be amended from its present form to allay my anxieties. I fear that that leads inevitably to the position that we will be compelled to vote against the clause.

Hazel Blears: There is a difference between our positions and it would be wrong not to acknowledge that. The hon. Gentleman's amendment is designed to cover the position in which people are members of a race, but it does not address the position of members of the Muslim community, who are not defined by their racial or ethnic group, or members of the Christian community, who are similarly not identified with a particular nationality or background. The amendment does not fill that gap.

Dominic Grieve: I am not sure that I agree with the Minister. Of course she is right about the Muslim community. There are white Muslims, African Muslims and Muslims from large numbers of Asian countries, as well as all sorts of other places. However, many manifestations of hatred are, in my experience, directed against fairly defined communities that do have characteristics that are ultimately founded on being a racial group, even though the hatred may well be expressed in terms of religion. She is right to point out that the existing legislation makes some provision for that. It highlights the question of whether this legislation is necessary. My amendment intends to make a little more provision for that scenario.

Hazel Blears: I have been given a couple of examples that may help the hon. Gentleman. Under existing legislation, a statement by a far-right group that Pakistanis are a threat to Britain because they are Muslims and want to kill Christians is potentially covered by the race offence, because it is likely to stir up hatred against a national group with which that religious group is associated—Pakistanis. Similarly, the race offence might apply if a far-right group said, ''All those Muslims from a particular town are a threat to Britain because they want to kill Christians'', if all the Muslims from that town are from a particular racial group; if, however, they are not, the race offence would not cover them. The question for the court is whether, considering all the circumstances, the actions are likely to stir up hatred against a group of people defined by their race or nationality, as opposed to a group defined by reference to their religion.
I am afraid that the hon. Gentleman cannot get away from the fact that he would not be providing a level playing field for people in this country to have their rights protected, because groups defined by their religion would not have the protection of the law under  the race offence. We should be honest that the result of his amendment would be to leave some people without the protection of the law in the way that we intend.

Evan Harris: I understand what the Minister said. There is a disagreement between the two sides. In defence of both the new clause tabled by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield and new clause 31, I say that I hope that she will accept that in the area in which we agree—that we ought to act when religion and religious words are used as a deliberate proxy for racial hatred—new clause 31 and new clause 17, even if not perfectly drafted, would help in making it absolutely clear to the courts, prosecutors and potential troublemakers, mischief makers and worse that that is the case. Will she concede that? I accept that the other group that she is concerned about would not be covered by the new clauses.

Hazel Blears: I have made it as clear as I can that the law on people who come from a racial group also covers a range of insulting, threatening and abusive behaviour that does not have to be racist but could extend to the religion of those in question. They are in the ambit of the legislation. It is on those grounds that I do not feel that the new clauses are necessary.
I am pleased that there is recognition across the House that we are trying to tackle real problems. Although I know that the Liberal Democrats share our ambition to ensure that the protection of the law covers everybody in our communities, I am a little disappointed that the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon and his party are not prepared to use their amendments to ensure that we are able to do that. It is interesting that the hon. Gentleman acknowledged that there is a difference between the parties. I asked him a simple question: does he think it right that people should be protected from having hatred stirred up against them on the grounds of their religion?

Evan Harris: There is not exactly same requirement because there is no legitimate reason to criticise and attack race—that is the difference between race and religion. However, the opposite applies to religion on occasion. It is necessary sometimes to criticise religious belief, but there is no basis for criticising race. There is clearly a difference. The Minister might not consider it sufficient difference to get in the way of her legislative bulldozer, but there is a difference.

Hazel Blears: The hon. Gentleman fails to appreciate a fundamental part of the offence. It is not about criticism of the belief, but stirring up hatred against people defined by reference to their belief. He is saying that he does not believe that people should be protected from having hatred stirred up against them on the grounds of their religious belief. I want to establish that difference: the Government believe that people should be protected in relation to reference to their racial origin and reference to their religious belief.  The Bill will not stop criticism of the belief, but it will stop hatred being stirred up against people on the grounds of religious belief.

David Heath: I do not want to extend the debate any further, but I want to make it absolutely clear that we do not wish to see incitement to hatred on any count whatever, whether that is race, religion, political belief or anything else. The difficulty we have with the Government's proposals is the inability to extricate criticism and proper discourse from incitement to hatred, which, as my hon. Friend says, is much more difficult in the case of religion than it is in the case of race.

Hazel Blears: I am disappointed that the Liberal Democrats are not in a position to support us yet. I hope that they will consider the matter further. When the plans were first formulated, the hon. Member for Winchester (Mr. Oaten), who speaks for the Liberal Democrats on home affairs, said that the plan to introduce the offence of incitement would close a loophole that had allowed inflammatory language to go unpunished, and that the Liberal Democrats would give the plans their support. I understand that they may have changed their position, but I am disappointed.

Evan Harris: I have to clarify that. First, it is our view as expressed in new clause 31 that we recognise that there is a problem. The Muslim community complain that racists are using religion as a basis for incitement to racial hatred and hoping to escape the coverage of the law. That remains to be seen, and it is doubtful whether that can be covered. We would support, as we have made clear, a measure to ensure that that loophole is closed. In September, we debated that openly at our party conference—perhaps the Labour party has, too—and we decided that if the law went any wider than dealing with the problem as attacks on Muslims as a proxy for racial attacks, it would pose too great a problem for freedom of speech to make it worth while. That is certainly true of the provisions in the Bill.

Hazel Blears: We have some clarity now. The Liberal Democrats want to plug the gap that is perceived but do not wish to take the extra step to ensure that Muslims, Christians, people of no religious belief, humanists and atheists are protected from having hatred stirred up against them.

Evan Harris: Socialists?

Hazel Blears: Not socialists; the measure is about religious belief. That clarity is welcome, but I urge the hon. Gentleman to think further about the matter before Report.
New clause 33 is the last item that the hon. Gentleman spoke about. It sets out four requirements for the Attorney-General to consider when making a decision about whether to prosecute under the offences of incitement to racial or religious hatred. He must consider whether the provisions are consistent with the Human Rights Act, whether the acts of the defendant were likely to imperil the safety of persons—which  links the effect to the intention—and whether there is a proper balance of human rights. Finally, there is a requirement in relation to publishing details of the various prosecutions that are carried out. As the Bill stands, all prosecutions would require the consent of the Attorney-General, which will prevent the provisions from being misused in private prosecutions. 
We know that the public interest test applied by the CPS has ensured that prosecutions are brought only when necessary. Even though the Liberal Democrat amendments are supported by Justice, they are not necessary. The protections that they are intended to obtain are already covered. In new clause 33, proposed subsection (1A) makes explicit the existing requirements of the Human Rights Act, but the courts must already ensure that they make their decisions in accordance with the European convention on human rights. If a prosecution came before the courts, they would be required to act in a way that was compatible with articles 9 and 10 of the convention. They may well have to carry out that kind of balancing act—they have to do that in any event.

Evan Harris: The Minister has just mentioned the courts, but we are talking about the decision made by the Attorney-General before the case reaches court. Her answer certainly does not address the basis on which that subsection has been promulgated. Will she deal with that? She may not feel that it is necessary, but what harm does it do to include it in the Bill?

Hazel Blears: It is not right to legislate simply to reiterate the current position of the law. I am not in favour of unnecessary words. I seek to reassure members of the Committee that the Attorney-General—as well as the courts—already has a legal requirement to consider the ECHR under the Human Rights Act, so the provision is an unnecessary restatement of the existing legal position.
New subsection (1C) is intended to ensure that the Attorney-General considers the circumstances when making those decisions. As I say, both the Attorney-General and the courts are already bound in that respect, so we do not need to make it explicit. More interestingly, under new subsection (1B), the Attorney-General has to consider whether the defendant, in stirring up hatred, has imperilled the safety of a particular group. I am concerned about that element of the new clause because it requires a link between the behaviour of the individual intending to stir up hatred and the reaction among those in whom hatred that imperils the safety of others is stirred up. That is not part of the offence itself in terms of the way in which the Public Order Act offences are amended. It would be wrong to introduce into the Attorney-General's decision about whether to prosecute elements that are not part of the offence itself. That direct linkage is not part of the offence, so it would be wrong to make it a consideration for the Attorney-General. 
Also, the provision appears to indicate that there would be no prosecution unless the defendant's acts were likely to imperil the safety of others. That is raising the threshold of the current offence. It would be  difficult to prove and it would make prosecutions for incitement even more difficult to bring than they currently are. I am certainly not in favour of that element of the new clause. Quite often there will not be an immediate reaction to the stirring up of racial hatred, so there will not be an immediate connection between the incitement and the imperilment of people. If there is that direct connection, we already have incitement provisions under the Public Order Act that cover incitement to commit a specific crime. 
The provisions we propose are designed to fill a gap and to prevent hate-mongering, because racial and religious hatred in itself has a corrosive effect on our communities, whether or not it immediately leads to specific acts of violence. It is important that we have the kind of communities where there is tolerance and respect for each other's different views, opinions and ways of life. Rather than providing any additional guarantees of freedom of expression, the hon. Gentleman's amendments would create an additional loophole that extremists could exploit to continue stirring up hatred on the basis of religion. 
I have nothing further to add and I know that Members are anxious to get on with the rest of the debate. I ask the Committee to reject the amendments.

James Clappison: I will seek a separate vote on amendment No. 226.

Andrew Mitchell: This has been an interesting and detailed debate that has covered the ground effectively. There is nothing further to be said at this point, except that the Opposition would like to return to these matters on Report. They will be of wider interest on the Floor of the House. In the meanwhile, we will vote against the clause. We would have withdrawn our amendments, but as they have not been moved, that is not necessary.

Evan Harris: I have just two points to make. Perhaps the Minister feels that this is not the appropriate place—where is?—but she has not really addressed the problem that we see in society of expectations being raised through large protests, some of them involving unlawful acts, that people shall not be subject to insult to their religion. I know that that is not the intention of the Bill, and I should be grateful if the Minister would clarify the steps that the Government are taking to make that clear.
The Minister has also been silent on the not unreasonable question raised by no less a person than Trevor Phillips of the Commission for Racial Equality and by Justice and the British Humanist Association, all of which are claimed to support her Bill—why has she not chosen the simple act of abolishing the blasphemy law? That would help send the message that the Bill is not about criticism of belief—the message she says she is so keen to send. The Government said that they would review the matter, but they have never explained why they are not seeking to abolish the blasphemy law. The longer the Minister remains silent on that point, the more difficult it is to convince people that they can be confident that she is confident that the  Bill will not stir up calls for protection of belief. Is there any reason why the Government are not seeking to repeal the blasphemy law?

Hazel Blears: Again, the hon. Gentleman is in danger of confusing the debate and conflating issues. I have made it as clear as I can that the provisions are not about blasphemy, but are about preventing people from stirring up hatred against one another. The hon. Gentleman brings in the separate issue of blasphemy. He knows that the Government are keeping that under review. We do not consider it appropriate to take action in that regard in connection with the Bill. The purpose of this fairly narrow, targeted Bill is to deal with the mischiefs that bedevil our communities, where hatred can be stirred up against vulnerable groups on grounds of their religion.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 10, Noes 7.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Schedule 10 - Racial and religious hatred

Amendment proposed: No. 226, in schedule 10, page 179, leave out lines 3 to 7. —[Mr. Clappison] 
Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 5, Noes 10.

Question accordingly negative. 
Schedule 10 agreed to.

Clause 123 - Directions as to behaviour in vicinity of parliament

David Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 191, in clause 123, page 87, line 14, at end insert 'or'.

Marion Roe: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
No. 190, in clause 123, page 87, line 15, leave out from 'Parliament' to end of line 17. 
No. 192, in clause 123, page 87, line 36, after 'officers', insert 
', being of or above the rank of inspector,'. 
No. 193, in clause 123, page 88, line 9, leave out 'one kilometre' and insert '100 metres'. 
No. 307, in clause 123, page 88, line 9, leave out 'one kilometre' and insert '250 metres'. 
No. 194, in clause 123, page 88, line 11, leave out subsection (11). 
No. 308, in clause 123, page 88, line 12, leave out paragraph (a).

David Heath: We have just come out of two extremely serious debates. One on the appropriate response to animal extremism and one on the proper way of dealing with incitement to religious hatred. The Government had serious things to say about both of those subjects and we can engage in a proper debate.
Clause 123 is similar to the earlier debate on the proposal to extend the power of arrest to absolutely anybody for absolutely anything. It is an example where the Government have gone completely bonkers. I really do not understand how they can bring forward such disproportionate proposals. This clause deals with the behaviour in the vicinity of Parliament. There is at the core one serious issue, which is the fact that Sessional Orders have been debated and it has been determined that they have no effect. I believe that it is important to the liberty of this country that there is free access to this Parliament. I do not want anything I say to be interpreted as meaning that it is all right for people to prevent Members of this House from coming here and exercising their democratic duty on behalf of their constituents. There are parts of clause 123 that it is sensible to have in statute if there is any doubt whatsoever as to what the duties of the Metropolitan Police are in respect of providing free access to this House. 
There is in this clause a totally different proposition, which is based on the long-standing demonstration that has taken place in Parliament square ever since the advent of the Iraq War. I set aside any sympathies I may have for the cause professed by those who are demonstrating. It does not matter whether I happen to agree with them or they happen to agree with me in terms of the war. What I cannot believe is that the Government, in response to a demonstration that they happen not to like, in a place where they happen not to want it to be, are prepared to bring forward not a civil remedy to provide for an injunction, but a new  criminal offence and the power for a police officer, in the rank of constable, to give a direction to someone who is 
''spoiling the visual aspect, or otherwise spoiling the enjoyment by members of the public, of any part of the designated area.'' 
In other words, a constable can decide that somebody looks untidy in Parliament square. Furthermore, on that basis they can apply an order with the force of law that excludes that person not just from Parliament square but from a radius of 1 km around Parliament square. I have taken care to map that area out so that I know exactly where these people might be excluded from. The area extends to Waterloo station and then goes right the way up to beyond Trafalgar square and across to Buckingham palace. It means that they would not be able to catch their train home if they happened to want to use Waterloo, Victoria, or Charing Cross, because they will be excluded from those areas by the fiat of a constable who thinks that they look untidy. 
This is a reduction to the absurd of the powers that the Government apparently wish to exert here. And for what? In order to deal with somebody exercising their democratic right to protest in a free society. I cannot see the argument for it. If—it is a big if—the permanent demonstration is a nuisance, there are grounds for applying an injunction against a nuisance. The proper remedy is in the civil courts, and if the Government do not believe that they can get satisfaction from the civil courts, they must try harder, or examine the arrangements for applying for an injunction in the civil courts. 
I do not believe that this way of dealing with the problem—if it is a problem, which I do not accept—is the right way to do it. My amendments therefore question almost every part of the clause. 
First, I question whether it is proper to include subsection 2(c), which refers to behaviour that is 
''spoiling the visual aspect, or otherwise'' 
because I do not believe that that matter is germane to the operation of Parliament. 
Secondly, I question whether it is appropriate for a police officer below the rank of inspector to take the decisions necessary under the clause. The clause provides that the powers should be exercised by the senior officer present, but the senior officer present could be a constable, and I do not believe that that is acceptable. 
Thirdly, I question why a radius of 1 km is specified. That is clearly excessive. Even if one accepts all the other premises behind the proposal, a radius of 1 km is excessive and, to test the Minister, I have included the proposal to substitute a radius of 100 m. 
I make my final point to seek clarification of the clause. Subsections (2)(a) and (b) contain serious considerations; if someone is preventing a Member of Parliament from going about their duties, that is a serious matter. Why, then, do the provisions not apply to someone who is engaged in conduct that is lawful under section 220 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992? Why should they be able to impede a Member of Parliament? Moreover, why do the provisions not apply to someone who is  taking part in a public procession of the kind mentioned in section 11(1) of the Public Order Act 1986? Why can they hinder any person from entering or leaving the Palace of Westminster or hinder the proper operation of Parliament? The clause is an absurdity. Unless the Minister can satisfy me on the points that I have raised—she will not be able to because the provisions are patently absurd—I shall have no option but to vote against the clause at the appropriate time.

Dominic Grieve: I have considerable sympathy with the points that the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome makes, as he will be aware from the fact that we have joined our names to his amendment. However, I also have some sympathy with those who consider that the current permanent encampment on the middle of Parliament square outside Parliament is an unsatisfactory state of affairs. I am a great believer in the right of the public to demonstrate, but it seems to me that a permanent demonstration, which rather than just being sited day after day in the same place, has become what amounts to an encampment, is excessive.
Having said that, I am concerned about legislation that has been put together to deal with that problem. It is clear that although the intention of subsection (2)(c), which refers to behaviour that is 
''spoiling the visual aspect, or otherwise spoiling the enjoyment by members of the public, of any part of the designated area'' 
is clearly targeted at the particular activity that has been taking place day after day, week after week and month after month outside Parliament, it could also operate to prevent any demonstration taking place there, even one of a limited kind, on the grounds that it spoils the visual aspect.

David Heath: A person does not even have to demonstrate; they just have to look unpleasant.

Dominic Grieve: As the hon. Gentleman says, one just has to stand there. It seems to me that the provisions of the clause are taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut. They are conferring powers that make me uncomfortable. The Minister will have to provide detailed justification for why the provisions are necessary.
I also share the puzzlement of the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome as to why existing law cannot deal with the problem on Parliament square. I can see that other provisions in the section could have a general application that is worthy. Again, I share entirely the view of the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome that the exception for the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 is bizarre, although I do not share his view about a public procession because, in such a case, one has to get prior permission. I can, therefore, see that that is a justifiable exception.

David Heath: I do not entirely understand why the hon. Gentleman accepts that. It does not matter whether prior permission has been given; if a  procession, although it is legal in terms of having gained prior permission, impedes a Member of Parliament attending a vote, it is equally culpable.

Dominic Grieve: The hon. Gentleman may be wrong, because Standing Orders of the House apply even in the event of a public procession, so the rights of Members of Parliament not to be impeded in entering the House of Commons would persist even if there were a demonstration. The Minister can doubtless clarify that.

David Heath: My understanding was that the Metropolitan Police Commissioner had indicated that he did not believe that he had the powers to execute the Sessional Orders given by Parliament to require that very thing. That is one of the reasons, I believe, why we have subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b).

Dominic Grieve: I appreciate that, and this would, doubtless, potentially replace that part of the Sessional Orders. On the other hand, it is worth bearing in mind when looking at subsection (11)(b), that as written notice has to be given for a demonstration under the Public Order Act 1986, if a demonstration were being properly conducted, one could expect provision to be made to ensure that Members of Parliament could continue to have access to Parliament while it was taking place. Let us face it, I can think of a number of demonstrations outside Parliament during the past eight years that have made access very difficult. Indeed, I can think of even more in the dim and distant past when people expressed their opinions even more vociferously than they do today. I am not over-troubled by that, but I share the view that there is something slightly wacky about putting in an exemption for the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 and not for anything else.
The other amendment, which the Minister will have seen, suggests a designated area of 250 m. I share the view that 1 km is a very wide area. It covers, rather conveniently, the whole central Government area in London. That has nothing to do with demonstrations outside Parliament. I cannot possibly support a 1 km total exclusion zone round the Palace of Westminster. It must be drawn far more narrowly and I suggest that it would be sensible to draw it with reference to a map, rather than just putting a circle round the edges of Parliament square. That would be a better way of achieving the desired effect. It is possible to come quite a long way into Parliament square without causing a problem. I wait to hear what the Minister has to say, but I feel that aspects of the clause are excessive.

Caroline Flint: We had an extensive debate on the Floor of the House on this issue, and members of all parties made their views known, including the Shadow Leader of the House, who welcomed clarification on the matter. Let me deal with the questions of processions, marches and trade unions. As the hon. Member for Beaconsfield has highlighted, legislation exists to deal with disruptive demonstrations in Parliament square; marches have to be agreed with the  Metropolitan police service, which can place conditions on them that include not impeding the workings of Parliament.
Secondly, there are strict rules under trade union legislation with regard to the way in which pickets can be organised, and those cover the obstruction of people accessing workplaces. Therefore, we oppose the amendments because they will take away the protection of trade unionists, some of whom work in this building, to exercise their rights. The current legislation covers how a picket line can be organised and how industrial protests can take place, and that includes tackling obstruction. It does not contradict the clauses before us. 
Amendment No. 190 removes the police's option of giving a direction to anyone spoiling the visual aspect or otherwise spoiling enjoyment by members of the public of any part of the designated area. That was debated on the Floor of the House. A number of people are concerned about the proliferation of banners, posters, placards, chairs and camp beds outside the Houses of Parliament. That is not just the Mayor of London: the Conservative-run Westminster council tried, through civil proceedings, to tackle the problem. Unfortunately, it failed; the judgment went against it. It is not for want of trying other ways to deal with the issue. 
We are not against people protesting in Parliament square. The measures before us today will not prevent that. They will still ensure that people have a right to protest, but there is an issue about the conditions in which that protest should take place. There is clear guidance under present legislation on what directions and conditions can be laid down for procession or assemblies of more than two people, but we have found a gap. The fact that Parliament square is an important world heritage site should be taken into consideration. As a constituency MP, I would not be happy about some of the heritage sites in my constituency being surrounded by those sorts of display. The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome may surprise me here, but would he be prepared to tell his constituents that he would be happy to have what we currently have in Parliament square at any of the heritage sites in his constituency? 
The provision is about proportion and saying that people can carry placards. Perhaps one direction can be that people can have as many placards as they individually can carry. That might be a way of people demonstrating their point of view with a visual display. It is about what is proportionate. We live in a country where anyone can come into the House of Commons and seek their MP in Central Lobby. There are countless ways in which they can make their views known. It is unfair to suggest that we are somehow denying people their democratic right to protest. 
Amendment No. 192 asks that the officer who gives the direction must be at least of the rank of inspector. That would cause operational difficulties for the police  if there were not an inspector at the scene and they had to wait for an inspector to impose the direction. I am sure that hon. Members whose passage to the House was being blocked would be unhappy if a sergeant or constable at the scene explained that they could not impose a direction until an inspector had arrived. We have the added safeguard that the officer who gives the direction should be the most senior in rank at the scene. That is in line with current powers to impose conditions on public assemblies in section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986. 
Amendments Nos. 307 and 193 seek to limit the area to which this applies. I understand where the hon. Members for Somerton and Frome and for Beaconsfield are coming from on this issue. We intend to lay an order with a precise area to be covered, and we intend to consult the Metropolitan police. It will cover the area where the demonstrations will disrupt the work of Parliament and hinder access to the House. Parliament could mean Millbank, 1 Parliament street or Norman Shaw. We have to map out the buildings of Parliament that would be affected. Unfortunately 1 km may be excessive, but 100 m or 250 m might not incorporate some of those other buildings.

Dominic Grieve: That makes much more sense. I suggest that we have a definitive map showing the area in which it would operate, so that everyone can understand exactly what the consequences would be.

Caroline Flint: That is a fair point. As I say, it will ensure that parliamentary buildings are covered.
Amendments Nos. 194 and 308 would remove the exemptions for legitimate trade union disputes and marches that are notified in advance. I hope that I have explained why it is not appropriate to remove those provisions. We want to make it clear to the police that they cannot use those powers for those who are peacefully picketing but for those whose offices are in a designated area. It is therefore appropriate that the police can use those powers against those who are frustrating the workings of Parliament. 
I have no more to say. We have tried to resolve matters in a number of ways, but we have not been successful. We want to make sure that people can protest, but there are limits on how they should be able to do it, and we have to take account of how it affects Parliament.

Andrew Mitchell: I am most grateful to the Minister for her response. It is a difficult issue. I am concerned about the encampment that exists for all the reasons given by my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, but I am equally nervous about the approach taken in clause 123. On Second Reading, I said that I thought that it would be appropriate for the matter to be decided on Report, as it clearly will be, because there is still a range of views across the House on the right  way to deal with the problem. There are other ways of dealing with it apart from the way enshrined in the clause, but I am in two minds over the matter.
It may help if I say that the advice that we will be giving through the usual channels is not to Whip the vote on Report on this question. I do not know whether that advice will be taken, but on that basis we would seek to withdraw the amendment.

David Heath: I hear what the Minister says, but as the hon. Member for Beaconsfield says, the words sledgehammer and nut are not far from my mind. What was said does not hold water. I was asked whether I had any heritage buildings in my constituency outside which I would not want to see demonstrations. I have heritage buildings in my constituency, but none of them has been the country's Parliament for about 1,100 years. I feel that Parliament is different. It is where the nation's democratic decisions are made, and it is a proper place for people to demonstrate and to express their views, whether in support of or against what we decide here. It is rather different from the normal run of historic buildings.
I am glad that the Minister is reconsidering her 1km zone, but I bet that when we get the definitive map, it will not cover only parliamentary buildings. I bet that it goes up Whitehall. I shall be amazed if the Government do not wish also to protect the surroundings of 10 Downing street and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, but we shall see. I give her the benefit of the doubt—for the moment. 
When it comes to the rank of inspector, I find it quite mind-boggling, and it should not be. We are asked to believe that the power is not necessary to deal with people in a lawful procession who hinder access to the House. I presume that there are powers for a sergeant to take immediate action. So, in the time that it takes to assess that someone is 
''spoiling the visual aspect, or otherwise spoiling the enjoyment by members of the public of any part of the designated area'' 
it seems that there will not be time to find a police officer of the rank of inspector to decide whether to apply an exclusion. It must be such an instant assessment that someone looks so untidy that a constable or a sergeant has to deal with it at that moment. That is nonsense, and I hope the Minister will reflect on just what nonsense she is perpetrating. 
I am still utterly unconvinced by this clause. If Mr. Brian Haw reads the report of these proceedings, I hope he will realise that his best course of action is to join the allied and federated union of anti-war protesters and allied trades, because then he will be able to continue exactly what he is doing at the moment, without lawful impediment. I will withdraw my amendments today, but will seek to vote against clause stand part. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment. 
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
Question put: That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Committee divided: Ayes 9, Noes 2.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
Clause 123 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Clause 124 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Clauses 129 and 130 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 131 - Power to seize etc. vehicles driven without insurance

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Marion Roe: With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 15—Power to seize etc. vehicles driven without a valid licence—
 'After section 164 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (c. 52) insert— 
 ''164A Power of constables to seize vehicles driven without a valid licence 
 (1) Subsection (3) applies where— 
(a) a contable in uniform requires, under section 164, a person to produce his licence for examination, 
(b) the person fails to produce such a licence, and 
(c) the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is being, or has been, driven in contravention of section 87. 
 (2) Subsection (3) also applies where— 
(a) a constable in uniform requires, under section 163, a person driving a motor vehicle to stop the vehicle, 
(b) the person fails to stop the vehicle, or to stop the vehicle long enough for the constable to make such lawful enquiries as he considers appropriate, and 
(c) the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is being, or has been, driven in contravention of section 87. 
 (3) Where this subsection applies, the constable may— 
(a) seize the vehicle in accordance with subsections (4) and (5) and remove it; 
(b) enter, for the purpose of exercising a power falling within paragraph (a), any premises (other than a private dwelling house) on which he has reasonable grounds for believing the vehicle to be; 
(c) use reasonable force, if necessary, in the exercise of any power conferred by paragraph (a) or (b). 
 (4) Before seizing the motor vehicle, the constable must warn the person appearing to drive, or have driven, the vehicle in contravention of section 87 that he will seize it if the person does not provide him immediately with evidence that he holds a valid licence.
 But the constable is not required to give such a warning if the circumstances make it impracticable for him to do so. 
 (5) If the constable is unable to seize the vehicle immediately because the person driving the vehicle has failed to stop as requested or has driven off, he may seize it at any time within the period of 24 hours beginning with the time at which the conditions in subsection (1) or (2) are first met. 
 (6) The powers conferred on a constable by this section are exercisable only at a time when regulations under section 164B are in force. 
 (7) In this section— 
(a) a reference to a motor vehicle does not include an invalid carriage; 
(b) a reference to a licence is a reference to a document or other evidence within section 98; 
(c) 'private dwelling house' does not include any garage or other structure occupied with the dwelling house, or any land appurtenant to the dwelling house. 
 164B Retention etc. of vehicles seized under section 164A 
 (1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provisions as to— 
(a) the removal and retention of motor vehicles seized under section 164A; and 
(b) the release and disposal of such motor vehicles. 
 (2) Regulations under subsection (1) may, in particular, make provision— 
(a) for the giving of notice of the seizure of a motor vehicle under section 164A to a person who is the registered keeper, the owner or the driver of that vehicle; 
(b) for the procedure by which a person who claims to be the registered keeper or the owner of a vehicle seized under section 164A may seek to have it released; 
(c) for requiring the payment, by the registered keeper, owner or driver of the vehicle, of fees, charges or costs in relation to the removal and retention of such a motor vehicle and to any application for its release; 
(d) as to the circumstances in which a motor vehicle seized under section 164A may be disposed of; 
(e) as to the destination— 
(i) of any fees or charges payable in accordance with the regulations; 
(ii) of the proceeds (if any) arising from the disposal of a motor vehicle seized under section 164A; 
(f) for the delivery to a local authority, in circumstances prescribed by or determined in accordance with the regulations, of any motor vehicle seized under section 164A. 
 (3) Regulations under subsection (1) must provide that a person who would otherwise be liable to pay any fee or charge under the regulations is not liable to pay it if— 
(a) he was not driving the motor vehicle at the time in question, and 
(b) he did not know that the vehicle was being driven at that time, had not consented to its being driven and could not, by the taking of reasonable steps, have prevented it from being driven. 
 (4) In this section— 
'local authority'— 
(a) in relation to England, means— 
(i) a county council 
(ii) the council of a district comprised in an area for which there is no county council, 
(iii) a London borough council, 
(iv) the Common Council of the City of London, or 
(v) Transport for London; 
(b) in relation to Wales, means the council of a county or county borough; and
(c) in relation to Scotland, means a council constituted under section 2 of the Local Government etc. (Scotland) Act 1994; 
'registered keeper', in relation to a motor vehicle, means the person in whose name the vehicle is registered under the Vehicle Excise and Registration Act 1994.''.'.

Caroline Flint: The clause concerns the ability to seize cars being driven by people who are uninsured. I think it is self-explanatory, and I hope it meets with approval in all parts of the Committee. We have to clamp down on people who wilfully do not pay their insurance. It is ridiculous that, if they are stopped, they are allowed to carry on driving.
The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome will be delighted to know that I have a great deal of sympathy with new clause 15, which he tabled. Again, there is a real issue about those who are unlicensed to drive being stopped by a police officer and then being allowed to keep on driving. That means that someone who has never taken a test can potentially drive. There are some other issues as well. After a number of discussions in my Department, it has come to my attention that one can be insured and at the same time unlicensed. That sounds bizarre, but apparently there are rare occasions where that is the case. 
I have also had extensive discussions about disqualified drivers who get stopped. If they are disqualified, they are breaching the terms and conditions of a procedure against them, and therefore they are committing an offence. However, just as with unlicensed drivers, there could be another potential loophole. There is an issue about whether I need to clarify whether a disqualified driver is defined in law as an unlicensed driver, because someone could just get points on their licence, leading to a six-month disqualification, although technically their licence is in abeyance; it is simply reactivated at the end of the disqualification period. 
Without further ado, I ask the hon. Gentleman not to press the amendment at this stage, on the basis that I shall introduce an amendment that I think will meet his concerns, and I shall consider whether there are issues in connection with disqualified drivers.

David Heath: I am obviously delighted to hear that. The proposal was suggested by the Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety and is eminently sensible. If the Minister returns with an amendment that not only does what I want her to do in the context of the new clause, but perhaps fills some other gaps too, I shall be extremely pleased, and I hope that she will give me appropriate credit on Report. On that basis, there is no reason for me to detain the Committee further on the new clause.
Question put and agreed to. 
Clause 131 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 132 - Payments by Secretary of State to police authorities in relation to the prevention, detection and enforcement of certain traffic offences

David Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 196, in clause 132, page 98, line 18, at end insert—
'Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 (c. 27) 
section 25(5) (pedestrian crossing regulations)'. 
The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 195, in clause 132, page 98, line 22, at end insert— 
'section 36(1) (drivers to comply with traffic signs)'. 
Government amendment No. 36. 
No. 200, in clause 133, page 99, line 15, at end insert— 
'Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 (c. 27) 
section 25(5) (pedestrian crossing regulations)'. 
No. 199, in clause 133, page 99, line 19, at end insert— 
'section 36(1) (drivers to comply with traffic signs)'. 
Government amendment No. 37.

David Heath: I hope that I have as much luck with this group of amendments, which are also designed to plug holes in the Bill without diverting in any way from the Government's intentions. The basic principle is to deal with drivers contravening advanced stop boxes for cyclists and other traffic signs in relation to the cost recovery scheme and, similarly, to allow fines for drivers failing to obey zebra and pelican crossing rules to be included in that scheme. That seems an eminently sensible suggestion and I commend it to the Minister.

Caroline Flint: Automatic number-plate recognition has given us an effective new tool to tackle serious traffic offences on our streets. I have had the opportunity to see it in action and I recommend that hon. Members look into it. It is a new development and we have only recently been expanding throughout the country the use of ANPR intercept teams at the roadside. A wide range of offences are covered, the most common being serious vehicle documentation and road safety offences—for example, using a mobile phone while driving. The new technology and the teams have significantly increased the detection of those and other offences.
This is about dedicated police intercept teams. An offence consistently detected by ANPR intercept teams is using a handheld mobile phone while driving. That was originally prosecuted under regulation 104 of the Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986. However, the specific offence of breach of requirements to control a vehicle in relation to mobile phones and so on is to be included in the Road Safety Bill via an insertion in section 42 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. Through an oversight, that offence was omitted from the original list of offences in relation to which police ANPR intercept teams are able to hypothecate at clause 132(3), hence it is subject to a Government amendment. A similar amendment has been tabled in respect of the list of offences  applicable to Scotland at clause 133(3). The Government seek to ensure that the strict offence criteria are met before a police force can hypothecate fixed penalty revenue generated through ANPR. 
I understand why the Liberal Democrats want to push additional offences, but I have had discussions with those involved in developing the policy on ANPR and I think that they feel that the offences that they currently target are appropriate, so at this stage we cannot accept the other offences being added to the list. ANPR is in its infancy and we want to ensure that the focus on the current group of offences is not diluted by widening the pool at this stage. Obviously, however, we keep these areas under review. Who knows? In future, as technology develops and perhaps the police carry out more of this work, we may return to the matter. It is proposed that the Secretary of State or, in Scotland, Scottish Ministers may by order amend the list of offences in subsection (3) to add, modify or omit any entries. Those will be closely scrutinised. 
With that explanation, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

David Heath: Well, Dame Marion, you win some, you lose some. That is a shame, because I think that the Government will want to come back and add these offences to the list, and there are strong arguments for doing so. They make provision for the most vulnerable road users—pedestrians and cyclists—and would be a very appropriate use of the technology. They would allow us to be at least relatively certain that people will not commit offences in places where others are otherwise put in great danger—in places where they are trying to cross the road or use cyclist stop boxes, but where motorists may have scant regard for their safety. My prediction is that the Government will eventually want to add these offences to the list. I gave them the opportunity to do so, and I wish that they had taken it up, but they have not, so there we are. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
Amendment made: No. 36, in clause 132, page 98, line 26, leave out 'and 104' and insert ', 104 and 110'.—[Caroline Flint.] 
Clause 132, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 133 - Payments by Scottish Ministers to police authorities etc. in relation to the prevention, detection and enforcement of certain traffic offences

Amendment made: No. 37, in clause 133, page 99, line 23, leave out 'and 104' and insert ', 104 and 110'.—[Caroline Flint.] 
Clause 133, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 28 - Corresponding Scottish offence

'(1) A person commits an offence if he enters, or is on, any designated Scottish site without lawful authority. 
 (2) A ''designated Scottish site'' means a site in Scotland— 
(a) specified or described (in any way) in an order made by the Secretary of State or by the Scottish Ministers, and 
(b) designated for the purposes of this section by the order. 
 (3) The Secretary of State may only designate a site for the purposes of this section if it appears to him that it is appropriate to designate the site in the interests of national security. 
 (4) The Scottish Ministers may only designate a site for the purposes of this section if— 
(a) it is comprised in Crown Land; or 
(b) it is comprised in land belonging to Her Majesty in Her private capacity or to the immediate heir to the Throne in his private capacity. 
 (5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that he did not know, and had no reasonable cause to suspect, that the site in relation to which the offence is alleged to have been committed was a designated Scottish site. 
 (6) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction— 
(a) to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or 
(b) to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, 
or to both. 
 (7) For the purposes of subsection (1), a person who is on any designated Scottish site without lawful authority does not acquire lawful authority by virtue of being allowed time to leave the site. 
 (8) In this section— 
(a) ''site'' means the whole or part of any building or buildings, or any land, or both; 
(b) ''Crown land'' means land in which there is a Crown interest. 
 (9) For this purpose ''Crown interest'' means an interest belonging to Her Majesty in right of the Crown.'.—[Caroline Flint.] 
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 29 - Designated Scottish sites: access

'(1) Section 1 of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 (asp 2) (access rights) does not apply to land in respect of which a designation order is in force. 
 (2) The Secretary of State may take such steps as he considers appropriate to inform the public of the effect of any designation order made by him. 
 (3) The Scottish Ministers may take such steps as they consider appropriate to inform the public of the effect of any designation order made by them. 
 (4) The steps referred to in subsections (2) and (3) may include, in particular, displaying notices on or near the site to which the order in question relates. 
 (5) But the Secretary of State or (as the case may be) the Scottish Ministers may only— 
(a) display any such notice, or 
(b) take any other steps under subsection (2) or (3), 
in or on any building or land, if the appropriate person consents. 
 (6) The ''appropriate person'' is— 
(a) a person appearing to the Secretary of State or (as the case may be) to the Scottish Ministers to have a sufficient interest in the building or land to consent to the notice being displayed or the steps being taken, or 
(b) a person acting on behalf of such a person.
 (7) In this section a ''designation order'' means an order under section [Corresponding Scottish offence].'—[Caroline Flint.] 
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 30 - Parental compensation orders

'Schedule (Parental compensation orders) is to have effect.'.—[Ms Blears.] 
Brought up, and read the First time.

Hazel Blears: I beg to move, that the Clause be read a Second time.
I do not know whether Liberal Democrat Members have any comments to make on the new clause, but I simply wanted to say that my right hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Brightside gave an undertaking that we would introduce it at this stage. Basically, it proposes a compensation order in cases, so that parents of children under 10 can be ordered to pay compensation if their children have stolen or damaged property. 
There are about 4,000 cases every year in which children under 10 cause significant damage, and we want to ensure that the courts can take action in those circumstances. They will take into account parental means and can make orders to pay compensation by instalments. Of course, it will always be necessary to consider the views of the victim, but the likely effect on the child and their family circumstances will also be taken into account. Often, orders will be taken in conjunction with intervention programmes to try to ensure that the behaviour is not repeated. Therefore an order is not simply a punishment; it is also a way of ensuring that parents take responsibility for the children's behaviour and that we limit the damage done to other families.

David Heath: This is a good deal more sensible than applying fixed penalty notices to 10-year-olds.

Hazel Blears: The hon. Gentleman and I have discussed these issues previously, and I understand that he is reluctant to take measures to tackle antisocial behaviour and to protect people in the community. We think that it is absolutely right to tackle people who commit antisocial behaviour, and 11, 12, 13 or 14-year-olds are often responsible for a lot of that behaviour in our communities. In this case, however, I am delighted that the hon. Gentleman is happy to support our new clause.

Andrew Mitchell: To avoid having to speak at length on the new clause, perhaps I can say that Her Majesty's Opposition strongly support it. Parents should be made responsible for the actions of their children, and we welcome the fact that the Government have introduced the proposal, even at this late stage.
Question put and agreed to. 
Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 26 - Economic damage to companies

'(1) A person (''person A'') commits an offence under this section if by acting in accordance with subsection (2) he causes financial damage to another person (''person B''), with the purpose of representing to person B, or persuading person B— 
(i) that he should not do something that he is legally entitled to do; or 
(ii) that he should do something that he is not under any legal obligation to do. 
 (2) A person acts in accordance with this subsection if those actions— 
(a) involve the harassment of or violence against person B or a connected person, or 
(b) involve damage to property of person B or a connected person. 
 (3) A connected person, for the purposes of subsection (2) above, means— 
(a) a customer of person B; 
(b) a shareholder of person B; 
(c) an employee of person B; 
(d) a director of person B; 
(e) where person B is a partnership, its partners; 
(f) a supplier of goods or services to person B; 
(g) a supplier of goods or services to persons within paragraph (f) above; 
 (h) an individual normally residing with any individual falling within paragraphs (a) to (g) above. 
 (4) A constable may arrest without warrant anyone whom he reasonably suspects to be committing an offence within subsection (1) above. 
 (5) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable— 
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both; 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine, or to both.'.—[Mr. Clifton-Brown] 
Brought up, and read the First time. 
Motion made, and Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 3, Noes 9.

Question accordingly negatived.

New Clause 27 - Causing death or serious injury by negligent driving

'(1) The Road Traffic Act 1988 (c. 52) is amended as follows.
 After section 2A (Meaning of dangerous driving) insert— 
 ''2B Causing death or serious injury by negligent driving 
 (1) A person who causes the death of or serious injury to another person by driving a mechanically propelled vehicle negligently on a road or other public place is guilty of an offence. 
 (2) A person is to be regarded as suffering serious injury if he suffers injury that is life changing or life threatening or both. 
 2C Meaning of negligent driving 
 A person is to be regarded as driving negligently if he drives without due care and attention, or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road or place.'' 
 (2) The Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (c. 53) is amended as follows. 
 In Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (c. 53) (prosecution and punishment of offences: offences under the Traffic Acts), after the entry relating to section 2 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 insert a new entry— 
 ''RTA section 2B Causing death or serious injury by negligent driving On indictment 10 years or a fine or both Discretionary Obligatory 3-11''.—[Vera Baird.] 
Brought up, and read the First time.

Vera Baird: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I pay tribute to my hon. Friends the Members for Wellingborough (Mr. Stinchcombe) and for South Dorset (Jim Knight), who have worked so hard on this massive issue. In a nutshell, the law on bad driving, which causes death and serious injury, needs to be rewritten. The new clause is an attempt to do so, or at least to ask the Government what they will do. 
I can put the argument briefly, as it is well known: the charge of dangerous driving carries a maximum sentence of two years; the charge of causing death by dangerous driving carries a maximum sentence of 14 years. That is clearly because the law accepts that the sentence must be higher because of the gravity of a life being lost. If somebody is killed by driving that is careless but not dangerous, what is the situation? Careless driving on its own results in a fine and penalty points; causing death by careless driving on its own not being an offence known to the law, means that there can only be a prosecution for careless driving, and consequently, even though a death has been caused, the penalty is a fine and points in exactly the same way. 
It is obvious from the first offence of dangerous driving and causing death that there is a principle that the law relates the consequence of death to the sentence, even when it is caused by the same level of fault that may cause no injury to anyone; yet that does not happen if someone causes death by careless driving. There is clearly a policy reason to change that and it is obvious from the work done by my hon. Friends, whom I have just praised, that there is a huge public demand for that to be done. My hon. Friends circulated petitions in their constituencies, and each had an overwhelming response. Everyone can cite a terrible case. My hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough raised the case of a young girl, Alexine Melnik, who was killed in a road accident. The driver of the car involved could be prosecuted only for careless driving, and he was fined £500. One can imagine how little satisfaction the Melnik family derived from that. 
Careless driving may sometimes be nothing more than a momentary loss of concentration, but cars are dangerous items. The message must be sent out that they are dangerous items and that if a car driver has a loss of concentration that causes death, it will be dealt with gravely. This is not an anti-motoring campaign. It is a campaign for justice. I invite the Minister to respond.

Paul Farrelly: I also congratulate our two colleagues, my hon. Friends the Members for Wellingborough and for South Dorset, on their work on the issue and thank my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar for raising it. It is a serious anomaly in the law that I hope the Government will address.

Vera Baird: I thank the hon. Gentleman.

Dominic Grieve: I am aware that there is only a brief period in which to discuss the issue, so I will be extremely brief. I understand the upset of those who have lost relatives or loved ones in a road accident. Of course there may be circumstances in which the road accident that occurred was due to what, in the old days, we would have called a person's ''recklessness'' or the person driving dangerously, which implies that there was an element of serious culpability in their conduct because they should have been aware that what they were doing was dangerous. In those circumstances, I have always been of the view that the courts should, if necessary, punish people severely for their actions.
However, I was slightly shocked to hear the words of the hon. and learned Lady. She desires not only to criminalise negligence but to criminalise it with sanctions that are potentially extremely severe. She explained that negligence could amount to nothing more than momentary inadvertence. It is for good reason that the law has made no distinction between the penalty that it imposes on a driver for momentary inadvertence if there is no injury to somebody else and the penalty it imposes if there is death or even multiple death. The culpability lies in the behaviour and, as the culpability is a negligent culpability, without any intention, it is wrong—in my view, profoundly wrong—to impose a further sanction to mark public disapproval because of the consequence. 
If we go down that road, there is no reason why we should confine ourselves to motoring. We could apply the principle to every area of human activity in which negligence by an individual, often deeply regretted, leads to injury to another. On the whole, we have historically left that matter to civil law. Where we have allowed it to stray into criminal law, it has always been characteristic that the sanctions imposed have not been more than a fine and certainly not a sentence of imprisonment. Take, as an example, the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974. I cannot support the new clause, which strikes me as being contrary to the entire tenor of how the law should operate.

Caroline Flint: I will be quick, though that is not because we do not take the situation seriously. We have great sympathy with what my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar said. I commend my hon. Friends the Members for Wellingborough and for South Dorset for their campaigning work, even though it arose out of the tragedies in their constituencies that affected the families that my hon. and learned Friend mentioned.
It is important that we see the introduction of such offences against the full background of the other offences and penalties that exist. To that end, we conducted a comprehensive review of road traffic offences involving bad driving. It is wide-ranging. We are considering all the issues concerning bad driving, particularly where death or injury occurs. The review makes a series of proposals. For example, it will consider a possible offence of death by careless driving. The review will be followed by the publication for public consultation of a paper setting out our proposals. We are treating that publication as a top priority and hope to publish it in the near future. I hope that that gives my hon. and learned Friend and the Members on whose behalf she is speaking some reassurance. I therefore urge her to withdraw her new clause.

Vera Baird: I am grateful to the Minister for her response. I am slightly surprised by the remarks of the hon. Member for Beaconsfield, but I can discuss the matter with him on another occasion to try to get him to change his mind. There are plenty of precedents where the same degree of wrong that has caused real injury is dealt with more gravely than where the person who did the wrong happened to be lucky enough to escape the consequences of their action. On behalf of my two colleagues, I hope that the review produces something that will help them to give some satisfaction back to their constituents. I accept entirely that my hon. Friend is taking the matter extremely seriously. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New schedule 1 - Parental compensation orders

1 The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c.37) is amended as provided in paragraphs 2 to 5. 
 2 After section 13 insert— 
 ''13A Parental compensation orders 
 (1) Subject to subsection (2) below, a magistrates' court may make an order under this section (a ''parental compensation order'') if on the application of a local authority it is satisfied, on the civil standard of proof— 
(a) that the condition mentioned in subsection (3) below is fulfilled with respect to a child under the age of 10; and 
(b) that it would be desirable to make the order in the interests of preventing a repetition of the behaviour in question. 
 (2) A court shall not make a parental compensation order unless it has been notified by the Secretary of State that arrangements for implementing such orders are available in the area in which it appears that the child resides or will reside and the notice has not been withdrawn. 
 (3) The condition is that the child has taken, or caused loss of or damage to, property in the course of—
(a) committing an act which, if he had been aged 10 or over, would have constituted an offence; or 
(b) acting in a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as himself. 
 (4) A parental compensation order is an order which requires any person specified in the order who is a parent or guardian of the child (other than a local authority) to pay compensation of an amount specified in the order to any person or persons specified in the order who is, or are, affected by the taking of the property or its loss or damage. 
 (5) The amount of compensation specified may not exceed £5,000 in all. 
 (6) The Secretary of State may by order amend subsection (5) above so as to substitute a different amount. 
 (7) For the purposes of collection and enforcement, a parental compensation order is to be treated as if it were a sum adjudged to be paid on the conviction by the magistrates' court which made the order of the person or persons specified in the order as liable to pay the compensation. 
 (8) In this section and section 13B and 13C, ''local authority'' has the same meaning as in the 1989 Act. 
13B Parental compensation orders: the compensation 
 (1) When specifying the amount of compensation for the purposes of section 13A(4) above, the magistrates' court shall take into account— 
(a) the value of the property taken or damaged, or whose loss was caused, by the child; 
(b) any further loss which flowed from the taking of or damage to the property, or from its loss; 
(c) whether the child, or any parent or guardian of his, has already paid any compensation for the property (and if so, how much); 
(d) whether the child, or any parent or guardian of his, has already made any reparation (and if so, what it consisted of); 
(e) the means of those to be specified in the order as liable to pay the compensation, so far as the court can ascertain them; 
(f) whether there was any lack of care on the part of the person affected by the taking of the property or its loss or damage which made it easier for the child to take or damage the property or to cause its loss. 
 (2) If property taken is recovered before compensation is ordered to be paid in respect of it— 
(a) the court shall not order any such compensation to be payable in respect of it if it is not damaged; 
(b) if it is damaged, the damage shall be treated for the purposes of making a parental compensation order as having been caused by the child, regardless of how it was caused and who caused it. 
 (3) The court shall specify in the order how and by when the compensation is to be paid (for example, it may specify that the compensation is to be paid by instalments, and specify the date by which each instalment must be paid). 
 (4) For the purpose of ascertaining the means of the parent or guardian, the court may, before specifying the amount of compensation, order him to provide the court, within such period as it may specify in the order, such a statement of his financial circumstances as the court may require. 
 (5) A person who without reasonable excuse fails to comply with an order under subsection (4) is guilty of an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale. 
 (6) If, in providing a statement of his financial circumstances pursuant to an order under subsection (4), a person— 
(a) makes a statement which he knows to be false in a material particular; 
(b) recklessly provides a statement which is false in a material particular; or 
(c) knowingly fails to disclose any material fact, 
he is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale.
 (7) Proceedings in respect of an offence under subsection (6) may, despite anything in section 127(1) of the 1980 Act (limitation of time), be commenced at any time within two years from the date of the commission of the offence or within six months of its first discovery by the local authority, whichever period expires earlier. 
 13C Parental compensation orders: supplemental 
 (1) Before deciding whether or not to make a parental compensation order in favour of any person, the magistrates' court shall take into account the views of that person about whether a parental compensation order should be made in his favour. 
 (2) Before making a parental compensation order, the magistrates' court shall obtain and consider information about the child's family circumstances and the likely effect of the order on those circumstances. 
 (3) Before making a parental compensation order, a magistrates' court shall explain to the parent or guardian of the child in ordinary language— 
(a) the effect of the order and of the requirements proposed to be included in it; 
(b) the consequences which may follow (under subsection (4)(b) below) as a result of failure to comply with any of those requirements; 
(c) that the court has power (under subsection (4)(a) below) to review the order on the application either of the parent or guardian or of the local authority. 
 (4) A magistrates' court which has made a parental compensation order may make an order under subsection (5) below if while the order is in force— 
(a) it appears to the court, on the application of the local authority, or the parent or guardian subject to the order, that it is appropriate to make an order under subsection (5); or 
(b) it is proved to the satisfaction of the court, on the application of the local authority, that the parent or guardian subject to it has failed to comply with any requirement included in the order. 
 (5) An order under this subsection is an order discharging the parental compensation order or varying it— 
(a) by cancelling any provision included in it; or 
(b) by inserting in it (either in addition to or in substitution for any of its provisions) any provision that could have been included in the order if the court had then had power to make it and were exercising the power. 
 (6) Where an application under subsection (4)(a) above for the discharge of a parental compensation order is dismissed, no further application for its discharge shall be made under that subsection by any person except with the consent of the court which made the order. 
 (7) References in this section to the magistrates' court which made a parental compensation order include any magistrates' court acting in the same local justice area as that court. 
 13D Parental compensation orders: appeal 
 (1) If a magistrates' court makes a parental compensation order, the parent or guardian may appeal against the making of the order, or against the amount of compensation specified in the order. 
 (2) The appeal lies to the Crown Court. 
 (3) On the appeal the Crown Court— 
(a) may make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal; 
(b) may also make such incidental or consequential orders as appear to it to be just. 
 (4) Any order of the Crown Court made on an appeal under this section (other than one directing that an application be re-heard by a magistrates' court) shall, for the purposes of section 13C above, be treated as if it were an order of the magistrates' court from which the appeal was brought and not an order of the Crown Court.
 (5) A person in whose favour a parental compensation order is made shall not be entitled to receive any compensation under it until (disregarding any power of a court to grant leave to appeal out of time) there is no further possibility of an appeal on which the order could be varied or set aside. 
 13E Effect of parental compensation order on subsequent award of damages in civil proceedings 
 (1) This section has effect where— 
(a) a parental compensation order has been made in favour of any person in respect of any taking or loss of property or damage to it; and 
(b) a claim by him in civil proceedings for damages in respect of the taking, loss or damage is then to be determined. 
 (2) The damages in the civil proceedings shall be assessed without regard to the parental compensation order, but the claimant may recover only an amount equal to the aggregate of the following— 
(a) any amount by which they exceed the compensation; and 
(b) a sum equal to any portion of the compensation which he fails to recover. 
 (3) The claimant may not enforce the judgment, so far as it relates to such a sum as is mentioned in subsection (2)(b), without the permission of the court.'' 
 3 (1) Section 8 (parenting orders) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In subsection (1), after paragraph (a) insert— 
''(aa) a parental compensation order is made in relation to a child's behaviour;''. 
 (3) In subsection (6)(a)— 
(a) after ''paragraph (a)'' insert '', (aa)'', 
(b) after ''child safety order,'' insert ''parental compensation order,''. 
 4 In section 18 (interpretation of Chapter 1), in subsection (1), after the definition of ''local child curfew scheme'' insert— 
''''parental compensation order'' has the meaning given by section 13A(1) above;''. 
 5 In section 114 (orders and regulations), in subsection (3), after ''section'' insert ''13A(6),''. 
 6 The amendments made by paragraph 2 of this Schedule do not apply in relation to any conduct which occurred before the coming into force of that paragraph.'.—[Caroline Flint.] 
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

Clause 148 - Orders and regulations

Amendment made: No. 49, in clause 148, page 113, line 17, after 'section', insert '1(3),'.—[Caroline Flint.] 
Clause 148, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Clauses 149 and 150 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Schedule 16 agreed to. 
Clauses 151 to 153 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 154 - Commencement

Amendments made: No. 50, in clause 154, page 116, line 11, at end insert— 
 '( ) So far as they relate— 
(a) to sections 113 and 115 of the Police Act 1997 as those sections apply to Scotland;
(b) to section 125 of that Act, to the Regulation of Care (Scotland) Act 2001, to the Protection of Children (Scotland) Act 2003 and to the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003, 
section 150 and Schedule 16 come into force on such day as the Scottish Ministers may by order appoint.'. 
No. 261, in clause 154, page 116, line 11, at end insert— 
 '( ) So far as they have effect for the purpose of conferring functions on the Scottish Ministers, sections (Corresponding Scottish offence) and (Designated Scottish sites: access) come into force on such day as the Scottish Ministers may by order appoint. 
 ( ) So far as it has effect in relation to any site designated under section (Corresponding Scottish offence) by the Scottish Ministers, section 121(3) comes into force on such day as the Scottish Ministers may by order appoint.'.—[Caroline Flint.]

Clause 155 - Short title and extent

Amendments made: No. 262, in clause 155, page 117, line 4, leave out 'to' and insert 
', 121 (except subsection (3)),'. 
No. 263, in clause 155, page 117, line 9, after '70,' insert— 
 '( ) sections (Corresponding Scottish offence), 121(3) and (Designated Scottish sites: access),'. 
No. 51, in clause 155, page 117, line 22, leave out 
'and repeals made by Schedules 14 and' 
and insert 'made by Schedule'. —[Caroline Flint.] 
Clause 155, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Title

Amendment made: No. 286, in title, line 8, after 'warrants', insert 
'and about parental compensation orders'.—[Caroline Flint.] 
Question proposed, That the Chairman do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.

Andrew Mitchell: This has been, for the most part, a congenial and serious Committee, and I extend the thanks of the Opposition to the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome, who has, by and large, had the same instincts as we have on most parts of the Bill.
I thank the Ministers for their courtesy, both in providing paperwork for us before the Bill and during the Committee's discussions. I thank the usual  channels who, if I am correct, managed to judge the timing for our proceedings to within a minute of the end time specified. 
We have examined all parts of the Bill. Promises of concessions have been made, and there has even been the offer of tea and discussions with the Home Office on a couple of issues. We will, of course, return to many of the issues on Report, and I should like to say to the usual channels that I hope that we may have two days on Report on the Floor of the House. No doubt they will deal with that in the normal way. 
Finally, I thank the Hansard reporters, and all those who have been involved in organising the eight sittings of the Committee. I also thank you, Dame Marion, and your co-Chairman, Mr. O'Brien, for the way in which you have efficaciously managed our affairs.

Caroline Flint: I thank you, Dame Marion, and Mr. O'Brien, for your excellent chairing of the proceedings. I also thank the Committee Clerks and all the officials who have supported me and my right hon. Friend during the proceedings. We have had good debates over the past fortnight; we have explored a number of areas and found consensus on some of those areas.
I thank my hon. Friends and the Opposition Front-Bench spokespeople and their colleagues for their contributions to the debates. I also thank the Whips—especially our own Whip who has done an excellent job in keeping us in order and to time. I wish everyone an enjoyable weekend.

David Heath: I concur with everything that has been said, and in addition should like to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon. It has been a good Committee in many ways. The Bill is largely a good Bill; it contains some things that we wish to improve further and some things that the Government have proposed on which we can build and on which there are grounds for consensus. There are a few areas of the Bill, however, on which we still think that the Government are absolutely bonkers, but we can deal with that later in its consideration.
I thank you, Dame Marion, and your co-Chairman for your chairmanship. 
Question put and agreed to. 
Bill, as amended, to be reported. 
Committee rose at five minutes to Seven o'clock.